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Executive Summary 
The aim of this report is to examine the available evidence regarding ICT’s current and 
projected climate impacts to stimulate policy developments and governance in the ICT 
sector.  
 
We examine peer-reviewed studies which estimate ICT’s current share of global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to be 1.8-2.8% of global GHG emissions. This 
corresponds with the baseline estimates for policy making in Europe (i.e. ‘more than 
2%’). We identify sources of variability in these estimates due to: 1) use of different 
data sources; 2) variation in the recency of the data used; and 3) varying approaches 
to boundaries of the analysis, specifically what is considered to be ‘in the scope’ of 
ICT’s footprint and what elements of its carbon footprint are considered. Our findings 
indicate that published estimates all systematically underestimate the carbon 
footprint of ICT, possibly by as much as 25%, by failing to account for all of ICT’s 
supply chains and full lifecycle (i.e. emissions scopes 1, 2 and fully inclusive 3). 
Adjusting for truncation of supply chain pathways, we estimate that ICT’s share of 
emissions could actually be as high as 2.1-3.9%. We also note the lack of public 
availability of the data behind many of these estimates. 
  
There are pronounced differences between available projections of ICT’s future 
emissions. These projections are dependent on underlying assumptions that are 
sometimes, but not always, made explicit. Key differences pertain to analysts’ 
answers to the following questions, which have important implications for policy: 
  
Are energy efficiency improvements in ICT continuing? While European policy 
assumes efficiency continues unabated at least through 2050, some experts warn that 
efficiency improvements in processor technologies are reaching a limit (cf. Moore’s 
Law) and could slow after 2025. If efficiency improvements to date have offset the 
impact of rising demand, then a limit on further efficiencies threatens soaring future 
emissions. Conversely, if efficiencies have been driving disproportionately greater 
demand and hence growth in emissions, then a decline in efficiencies could help to 
reduce emissions. 
 
Are energy efficiencies in ICT reducing ICT’s carbon footprint? Throughout at least 
seven decades of continuous efficiency gains in ICT, the GHG emissions of the sector 
have risen steadily. This may suggest that efficiencies spur greater demand at a pace 
that significantly undermines, if not exceeds, the efficiency savings gained. 
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Are ICT’s emissions likely to stabilise due to saturation? Some experts argue that 
energy consumption by ICT will be capped by natural limits to the number of devices 
people will want to own and the amount of time they have in a day to use them. And 
yet, technological innovation, not least those resulting from major investment by 
governments around the world are likely to produce novel applications for ICT that 
drive additional energy demand. Note that the areas with the heaviest investment are 
seldom user-mediated (i.e. machine-to-machine communication from machines that 
run continuously in the background), so a saturation argument would not apply. 
  
Is data traffic independent of ICT emissions? While data traffic is not directly 
proportional to emissions, video streaming provides a clear example of a larger 
historical pattern that rising data traffic peaks require additional internet infrastructure 
to meet demand, which then allows further data-intensive services to exist, ultimately 
leading to higher emissions. Netflix’s agreement with the EU to reduce their traffic and 
ease the load on the network – allowing network provision for homeworkers during the 
Covid-19 pandemic – further evidences that data traffic is not independent of ICT 
infrastructure growth and its emissions. 
  
Is ICT enabling carbon savings in other industries? The central premise of the new 
European Green Deal is that ICT saves more emissions through the efficiencies it 
enables in other sectors than it produces through its own energy consumption; ICT 
has the huge potential to deliver savings and has shown its value for enabling activities 
that would otherwise be restricted during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, ICT’s net 
effect on global emissions depends on the extent to which ICT substitutes more 
traditional, carbon-intensive activities rather than being offered in addition to them, 
thereby increasing our global carbon footprint. Furthermore, ICT-enabled efficiency 
improvements in other industries might lead to greater demand that more than offsets 
any efficiency gains and therefore lead to increased emissions in the wider economy. 
  
Will renewable energy decarbonise ICT? The ICT sector is leading the way in the shift 
to more renewable energy consumption which has helped the sector reduce its 
emissions. This shift is needed along with increases in renewable energy capacity as 
all sectors will have to replace fossil fuel with energy from renewable sources. Yet, 
renewable energy itself has a significant carbon footprint, embodied in its 
infrastructure and supply chains and also for the time being, there are practical 
constraints to the use of renewables. A limit to absolute energy consumption is most 
likely needed in addition to higher shares of renewable energy to achieve ambitions 
for carbon-neutrality of data centres, as per the European Commission’s recent 
commitment for 2030. 
  
Whatever position they take on these crucial questions, analysts agree that ICT will 
not reduce its emissions without a major concerted effort involving broad 
political and industrial action. Under business as usual, the most optimistic 
projection sees ICT’s emissions staying stable at the current level. Yet, the global 
economy needs to reduce its emissions by more than 42% by 2030, more than 72% 
by 2040, and more than 91% by 2050 in order to meet the Paris Agreement goal of 
staying within 1.5°C, and it remains to be seen whether the ICT sector itself must 
reduce at a rate on par with the global economy or is justified in reducing at a slower 
pace. This depends on the balance between the carbon savings that are enabled by 
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ICT and the carbon costs of ICT in enabling those savings. There are three reasons 
to believe that ICT’s emissions are going to increase barring a targeted 
intervention: 
• Firstly, we note that historically, ICT-enabled efficiency improvements have 
gone hand in hand with increases in energy consumption and GHG 
emissions both within the ICT sector and in the wider economy. While it 
cannot be proven that ICT efficiency gains lead to rebounds in emissions that 
outweigh any savings, there are so many circumstances in which reductions in 
inputs per unit of output lead to a net increase in inputs that this has to be a 
significant risk; and one that is often underappreciated. If this dynamic does 
apply, the only ways to harness emission savings from efficiencies may be 
through a constraint on consumption (as like Covid-19 has temporarily 
imposed), or a carbon constraint (such as a carbon tax or a cap on emissions). 
• Secondly, current studies make several important omissions surrounding 
the growth trends in ICT. Blockchain is generally excluded from calculations, 
and Internet of Things (IoT) devices are sometimes partly included but their 
effect on complementary growth in energy consumption by data centres and 
networks is not. These trends alongside Artificial Intelligence (AI) do offer 
opportunities for efficiency gains, but there is no evidence to suggest these 
create GHG savings that outweigh the additional emissions these technologies 
would cause. Moreover, while associated carbon footprints might be acceptable 
in scenarios where these technologies are applied toward realising greater 
carbon reductions in the wider economy, it is certainly not the case that the 
majority of the innovation in these trending areas is for the purposes of yielding 
carbon reductions, and so could be purely additional. 
• Thirdly, there is significant investment in developing and increasing 
uptake of Blockchain, IoT and AI. All three represent key market 
opportunities, provide a range of claimed public benefits and are further 
believed by some to enable up to 15% reductions in global emissions. While 
significant if achieved, this falls well short of the reductions needed to meet 
climate change targets. There is a risk that these technologies might also 
contribute to increases in emissions through stimulating increased carbon-
intensive activities such as ‘Proof of Work’ algorithms and training ever more 
complex machine learning models.  
 
In light of these considerations, it seems risky, at the very least, to assume that ICT 
will, by default, assist in the attainment of climate targets.  
 
Recently, some large technology corporations have pledged to voluntarily reduce their 
carbon footprint and counteract emissions through offsets. Not all pledges are 
ambitious enough to meet net zero targets by 2050, and so far, there are no 
mechanisms for enforcing sector-wide compliance. 
 
Without a global carbon constraint, we contend that a new regulatory framework 
is required to introduce an ICT-specific constraint on carbon or energy 
consumption – ensuring that the full impacts of ICT are considered systematically 
and drawing consistent boundaries for analysis that are fully inclusive of supply chains. 
This needs to be backed by the availability of objective and high-quality data reviewed 
on an annual basis that can be openly and repeatedly inspected. ICT has clearly 
demonstrated significant potential for year-on-year efficiency improvement and better 
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exploitation of green energy, but without a cap and inclusion of the full lifecycle of ICT, 
it looks likely that carbon savings through efficiency improvements will continue to be 
outpaced by rising demand through rebound effects rather than achieve net zero from 
ICT efficiency gains. We contend that this should be the default assumption in 
the absence of strong evidence of a change in the dynamics of efficiency and 
growth, capable of causing ICT to buck its historical trend. 
 
However, we also contend that if a global carbon constraint were introduced, 
efficiencies within and enabled by ICT would be even greater enablers of 
productivity and utility than they are today. A global carbon constraint is therefore 
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The Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector has seen a massive 
growth in the last 70 years. With large parts of the economy not yet digitised and 
emerging economies entering the market, ICT is set to grow even further over the next 
decade [The Economist 2020]. At the same time, there has been an increasing 
awareness of the potential environmental effects of ICT, particularly on climate change 
[e.g. Kaapa 2017, Guardian Environment Network 2017, Belkhir 2018, Tarnoff 2019, 
BBC iPlayer 2020]. 
 
The impact that the ICT sector has on climate change can be expressed as a carbon 
footprint: that is, an estimate of the amount of greenhouse gases (GHG) released 
because of a product or activity from all its lifecycle stages. This includes embodied 
emissions (the GHG emissions released from the extraction of raw materials required, 
the manufacturing process and transport to the business or user), use phase or 
operational emissions (from energy use and maintenance) and end-of-life emissions 
(emissions after disposal). 
 
This report looks at the evidence on the climate change impacts of ICT now and in the 
future, both through its own GHG emissions and through its effect on the wider society 
and economy (Section 2). Central to this is the question of efficiency, and whether 
efficiency gains may reduce emissions over time or if they are more than offset by 
‘rebound effects’. In this context, we take a broad view of rebound effects to include 
any increase in emissions due to the introduction of ICT or the efficiencies it enables 
(see Section 1.1 Jevons Paradox for an example of a rebound effect). We also explore 
important trends in ICT (namely: big data, data science and Artificial Intelligence (AI); 
the Internet of Things (IoT); and Blockchain) that could provide both opportunities and 
risks for global emissions (Section 3), as well as relevant government and industry 
policies (Section 4). 
 
In the study, we have adopted a broad definition of ICT to include all types of data 
centres, networks and user devices (see Appendix A for Methodology). While there 
are limitations to our study in terms of the literature review scope and the uncertainties 
of carbon calculations (see Appendix A.6), we are confident we have captured the 
main debates regarding this topic, and contribute to those debates through our focus 
on GHG emissions. We specifically focus on GHG emissions rather than electricity 
consumption as the former drives climate change and the latter does not capture 
important factors surrounding ICT’s environmental impact (see Appendix A.6). 
 
Given the significance of the topic, there are surprisingly few studies analysing the 
environmental impact of ICT and they are often characterised by a lack of 
interrogatability, potential for conflict of interest, a limited scope that leaves out growing 
ICT trends and an underestimation of ICT’s carbon footprint because significant 
proportions of total emissions are omitted. We have therefore extended our data 
collection process to include consultations with the lead authors of the main studies 
included in this review in order to better assess their ICT emission estimations. We 
endeavoured to understand both the criticisms levelled at each study and how they 
are countered. We also looked carefully at potential motivations, the quality and 
transparency of data underpinning the work, and the resources that each study had at 
its disposal.  
 
 




Whilst we found broad agreement on the size of ICT’s current carbon footprint, there 
are a range of different views with regards to ICT’s future role in climate change – both 
in terms of ICT’s own carbon footprint and its effect on the wider economy’s emissions. 
We discuss the arguments and assumptions underpinning these different views and 
their policy implications in the following sections. 
 
1.1 Jevons Paradox 
In 1865, William Stanley Jevons predicted that as the UK’s use of coal became more 
efficient, it would make coal more attractive and thereby would increase demand for 
coal rather than reduce it [Jevons 1865]. Jevons Paradox refers to a situation in which 
an efficiency improvement leads to an even greater proportionate increase in total 
demand, with the result that resource requirement goes up rather than down, as is 
often assumed. There is evidence that Jevons Paradox applies beyond coal [e.g. 
Alcott 2005, Sorrell 2009, Schaffartzik et al. 2014]. An example is the increased energy 
efficiency of new forms of lighting (such as electric lighting compared to gas lighting) 
which allowed lighting to be used more widely – increasing the total energy 
consumption from lighting. Another demonstration is the fact that electric trains are 
vastly more efficient than steam trains, let alone horses, yet the carbon footprint of 
land transport has continuously risen over the time period that these technological 
advances took place due to expanded use [Berners-Lee and Clark 2013]. 
 
While Jevons Paradox is linked with efficiency as the principal driver of rebound 
effects, the paradox is frequently linked more broadly to a wide range of socio-
economic drivers leading to a perverse increase rather than decrease in input demand.  
Macro-economic models suggest that this ‘backfiring’ or rebound effect leads to 
savings being cancelled out completely on average and even adding input demand 
relative to previous levels through a variety of mechanisms.1 At the global level, 
efficiency improvements in almost every aspect of life have gone hand in hand with 
rising energy demand and rising emissions. 
 
It is sometimes argued that without the efficiency improvements, demand would have 
increased even further; this assumes that demand would rise independently of 
efficiency. It is also argued by some [e.g. GeSI 2015; UK Energy Research Council 
2007] that rebound effects are less than 100% of the efficiency savings, but this often 
results from an incomplete consideration of rebound pathways, especially macro-
economic effects. To assess the full impact of rebound effects, all parts of the economy 
and a longer timescale need to be considered. The only way to feasibly do this is to 
analyse the combined effect of all global efficiency gains in all sectors and to track this 
 
1 Jevons Paradox and rebound effects are explored in more detail in Berners-Lee and Clark’s book The 
Burning Question (2013). Briefly, they argue that when we improve energy efficiency, the available 
energy becomes more productive and therefore more valuable, leading to increased use. This is 
because any energy saved bounces back as additional energy elsewhere, either because: 1) efficiency 
makes the use of the resource cheaper (e.g. lighting, cloud storage of more data than with traditional 
file storage), 2) the savings are spent on other activities with a carbon footprint, 3) lower resource use 
leads to lower prices which increases demand for the resource elsewhere, or 4) knock-on effects in 
other areas of the economy (e.g. when video conferencing enables forming relationships with people 
on the other side of the world, leading to more air travel to visit them). Resource use can also be 
displaced into another country (e.g. when burning of fossil fuel domestically is restricted to lower the 
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against global energy use. This analysis yields a total energy rebound averaging 
102.4% over the past 50 years (i.e. the annual global growth in energy use) [Berners-
Lee and Clark 2013]. Despite the increasing utility per unit of energy, the world’s 
energy use is increasing. The same holds true for emissions. Over the last 170 years, 
CO2 emissions have been rising at 1.8% per year (with only temporary deviations on 
either side of that trajectory) [Berners-Lee and Clark 2013] alongside the growth of 
ICT, vast efficiency gains in ICT and other technological advances in other industries. 
 
In terms of the ICT industry, it has been argued that it is through its increasing 
efficiency that computational power has risen and ICT has been able to become so 
important in society; the energy consumption of early computers would have been 
prohibitive for the scale of expansion we have seen over the last decades 
[Aebischer and Hilty 2015]. An analysis of dematerialisation by Magee and 
Devezas [2017] found evidence that, in the ICT industry, efficiencies in the material 
needed for a single product lead to either increasing performance or reduced prices 
and that this inadvertently leads to increases in demand, resulting in an increase in 
absolute material consumption. Silicon is one example as it holds a special place in 
information storage, transmission and computing. Other examples of rebound effects 
in ICT are provided by Gossart [2015], Galvin [2015] and Walnum and Andrae [2016]. 
Galvin [2015] estimates that rebound effects in ICT’s energy use could range between 
115% and 161% based on eight case studies, as efficiency is more than offset by 
increases in demand. 
 
In addition to efficiencies within the ICT industry, ICT-delivered efficiencies can also 
have far-reaching effects in other industries – in what we will call Global Rebounds. In 
recent years, ICT has increasingly expanded into other sectors. Common examples 
include video conferencing technologies or online shopping which could reduce the 
need to physical travel or reading news on a smartphone. These have the potential to 
both decrease and increase environmental impact. Where these new technologies 
evolve to be more energy intensive than their alternatives (e.g. high-quality video 
streaming), where they are used in addition rather than as a substitute (e.g. e-books 
being used alongside paper books), or where they allow intensified activity or growth 
in other industries because they are cheaper, more productive or more convenient 
(e.g. more regular checking of news on a smartphone than with traditional newspapers 
leading to increased need for news production), the impact of the economy as a whole 
in terms of energy use, resource use or GHG emissions can increase [Court and 
Sorrell 2020].  
 
In a systemic review of the direct and economy-wide impact of e-materialisation (such 
as e-publications, e-games, e-music etc.) on energy consumption, Court and 
Sorrell [2020] found that studies systematically neglect rebound effects. Most studies 
assume substitution of old technology with the new digital system where this 
assumption is not always justified, leading to overestimates of energy savings. 
Assumptions around the lifetime, the number of users, efficiency of user devices and 
the replacement of travel lead to a wide range of predictions from 90% decreases to 
2000% increases in energy consumption. They conclude that there is no conclusive 
evidence suggesting significant current or future energy savings from e-
materialisation. There is another aspect to efficiency: psychological spillovers through 
moral licensing where people feel that they have done their part for the environment 
when increasing efficiency and then go on to have an increased environmental impact 
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The net effect of ICT depends on the balance of impacts it has both through its own 
emissions and the effects it has on the wider economy. The economy-wide effects of 
ICT are difficult to quantify, but in the absence of solid evidence, it would at the very 
least be risky to assume that the Jevons Paradox and other rebound effects (e.g. time 
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2. Estimating the Carbon Footprint of ICT  
In this section, we provide the following: 
• a broad overview of the estimates for ICT's carbon footprint before 2015; 
• an in-depth analysis of three major peer-reviewed studies of ICT's own 
greenhouse emissions; 
• an overview of the arguments and assumptions underpinning the different 
estimates for ICT’s future carbon emissions and ICT’s impact on the wider 
economy; 
• a summary of what this analysis means for global climate targets. 
 
2.1 ICT’s carbon footprint 
Historically, ICT emissions have grown continuously alongside global 
emissions. 
Several studies prior to 2015 have estimated the carbon footprint of ICT (summarised 
in Figure 2.1 see also Table B.1 in Appendix B.1 for a summary). These show an 
increase in ICT’s carbon footprint over time, even without these studies considering 
the full life cycle emissions. This growth in ICT’s emissions has coincided with 
consistent growth in our total global carbon footprint [Ritchie and Rose 2019]. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Estimates of ICT’s carbon footprint from studies published before 2015. The linear best fit line shows 
the increase in emissions with time, although the growth is not necessarily linear. 
 
Scientific debate over ICT’s emissions has intensified in the last five years. We 
therefore focus on research since 2015 – especially studies by three main research 
groups led by Andrae [Andrae and Edler (A&E) 2015, Andrae 2019a, 2019b, 2019c], 
Belkhir [Belkhir and Elmeligi (B&E) 2018] and Malmodin [Malmodin and Lundén (M&L) 
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2018; Malmodin in personal communication].2 We summarise the arguments here and 
direct the reader to Appendix B where we analyse these studies in more depth and 
provide an overview of reports deemed out of scope for this review. 
 
2.1.1 ICT’s current carbon footprint 
ICT is estimated to form ca. 1.8-2.8% of global GHG emissions in 2020 
Estimates of ICT’s emissions in 2020 (see Figure 2.2) vary between 0.8 and 2.3 
GtCO2e. The highest estimates (A&E ‘worst case’) put ICT's share of global GHG 
emissions around 6.3%, but Andrae now believes that the A&E 'best case' scenario of 
around 1.5% is more realistic for 2020 [personal communication]. B&E’s estimates are 
higher at 1.9-2.3%, especially considering they omit TVs in their total estimate. 
Malmodin’s estimates sit in between the others at 1.9% of global emissions. When 
adjusting for differences in scope (see Table B.4 in Appendix B.2.2), these studies 
point towards a footprint of 1.0-1.7 GtCO2e for ICT, TVs and other consumer 
electronics in 2020; this is 1.8-2.9% of global GHG emissions. We stress that this 
estimate carries some uncertainty but gives us a reasonable idea of the impact of ICT. 
Across studies, roughly 23% of ICT’s total footprint is from embodied emissions, yet 
the share of embodied emissions for user devices specifically is ca. 50%. This is 
because, unlike networks and data centres, user devices are only used for parts of the 




2 A&E [2015] estimate ICT’s emissions for every year 2010-2030, B&E [2018] for 2007-2040 and M&L 
[2018] for 2015. Malmodin has also provided additional estimates for 2020 to us in personal 
communication. 
3 Electricity consumption of user devices and domestic equipment has decreased over the last 15-20 
years driven by legislation and public procurement policy such as the EU ERP directive and EnergyStar 
[Preist, personal communication]. However, efficiency improvements will not be able to reduce 
embodied emissions drastically. While production processes are becoming more efficient, the 
manufacturing footprint of smartphones is increasing because of more advanced integrated circuits, 
displays and cameras [Malmodin, personal communication]. With a large share of their footprint coming 
from their manufacture, extending smartphones’ lifetime is the best way to reduce their footprint. Most 
studies reviewed here assume an average lifetime of 2 years, partly driven by phone contracts that 
promise users the newest models [B&E]. There are some signs, though, that this might be increasing 
slightly. For example, the NPD [2018] reported that in the US, the average use has increased to 32 
months in 2017 up from 25 months in 2016. Legislation encouraging repair e.g. the EU Waste Electrical 
and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive, can help, alongside business models centering around 
service rather than product provision or selling repairable products to markets in the Global South 
[Preist, personal communication].  
 
 





Figure 2.2 Estimates for global ICT’s carbon footprint in a) 2015 and b) 2020. Note that for M&L’s estimates, TV 
includes TV networks and other consumer electronics (Error! Reference source not found. in Appendix B.2.1), 
whereas for A&E’s estimates, only TVs themselves and TV peripherals are included. B&E did not include TVs. 
M&L’s original estimates for the ICT and E&M sector includes paper media which we have excluded here. A 
breakdown of these estimates can be found in Table B.3 in Appendix B.2.2. 
 
There are important differences in how analysts arrived at these estimations 
There is a lack of agreement about which technologies ought to be included in 
calculations of ICT's GHG emissions – particularly TV (see Appendix B.2.1). All 
studies include data centres, networks and user devices as the three main 
components of ICT, but there are pronounced differences of opinion regarding the 
proportional impact of each. A comparison of the different proportions in 2020 
estimates (excluding TV) is provided below (Figure 2.3 Proportional breakdown of 
ICT’s carbon footprint, excluding TV. A&E’s Best Case is displayed because more 
recent analysis by the lead author suggest that this scenario is most realistic for 2020. 
Note that Malmodin’s estimate of the share of user devices is highest; this is mostly 









Figure 2.3 Proportional breakdown of ICT’s carbon footprint, excluding TV. A&E’s Best Case is displayed because 
more recent analysis by the lead author suggest that this scenario is most realistic for 2020. Note that Malmodin’s 
estimate of the share of user devices is highest; this is mostly because Malmodin’s network and data centre 
estimates are lower than those of the other studies. 
Regarding data centres, Belkhir himself noted that his projection of 495 MtCO2e for 
data centres in 2020 is overestimated [personal communication]. Recent evidence by 
Masanet et al. [2020] of 205 TWh total energy use in 2018 seems to converge with 
Malmodin’s estimate of 127 MtCO2e in 2020. Assuming a global electricity mix at 0.63 
kgCO2e/kWh, Masanet et al.’s estimate comes to ca. 129 MtCO2e – higher than A&E’s 
best case estimate of 217 MtCO2e. 
 
Studies systematically underestimate the carbon footprint of ICT due to 
truncation error 
Malmodin’s studies are the most comprehensive as they include operator activities 
and overheads (e.g. offices and vehicles used by data centre and network operators), 
as well as considering the full lifecycle emissions of equipment (i.e. from production, 
use, to disposal) rather than just production energy (A&E) or only material extraction 
and manufacturing energy (B&E). 
However, A&E, B&E and M&L all follow Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) methodology which 
is unable to include the infinite number of supply chain pathways of a product, thereby 
incurring ‘truncation error’ in their carbon accounting. They also do not consider the 
full carbon footprint of electricity used to run ICT equipment. This can be rectified by 
combining LCA with Environmentally Extended Input Output (EEIO) methodologies – 
taking into ICT’s scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions – and adjusting the carbon intensity factor 
of electricity. When these omissions are adjusted for truncation error (see Appendix 
F), the carbon footprint for ICT, including TVs and other consumer electronics, rises 
to 1.2-2.2 GtCO2e (2.1-3.9% of global GHG emissions) in 2020 with ca. 30% coming 
from embodied emissions and 70% from use phase emissions. We stress once more 
that these are rough estimates with a significant degree of uncertainty. 
 
2.1.2 ICT’s future carbon footprint 
There is broad agreement by analysts in the field on certain key assumptions. 
• The world’s carbon footprint needs to decrease to avoid climate catastrophe; 
• Data traffic is continuing to grow; 
• Energy demand by ICT is increasing;  
• Demand for data centres and network services will increase; 
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• The shift to smartphones is decreasing emissions from PCs and TVs; 
• Using more renewable energy would reduce ICT emissions; 
• ICT could reduce emissions in other sectors but not by default and only under 
certain conditions (contrasting to GeSI’s [2015] SMARTer 2030 claims); 
• ICT has the potential to increase its own emissions and facilitate rising 
emissions in other sectors. 
Opinions are more divided regarding future trends in emissions. 
From 2015 to 2020, B&E’s and A&E’s estimates of ICT emissions have increased due 
to an increase in data traffic and the number of user devices (see Figure 2.2). In 
contrast, Malmodin’s estimates have decreased slightly – mostly for data centres (by 
10%), due to an increased adoption of renewable energy, and networks (by 8%), due 
to decreases in overheads, despite increases in their electricity consumption. 
 
Malmodin [personal communication] argues that: GHG emissions from ICT have 
stabilised for now; ICT and Entertainment and Media (E&M) sector growth is starting 
to decouple from GHG emissions; and that ICT could even halve its 2020 emissions 
by 2030 through renewable energy transformation and collective effort [Malmodin 
2019], to 365 MtCO2e in 2030 [Malmodin, 2020]. In contrast, B&E and A&E believe 
that emissions from ICT will continue to grow (see Figure 2.4). We explore the 
differences of opinion between the three in more detail in Appendix B.3. 
 
All analysts think that, theoretically, it would be possible for ICT to decrease its 
emissions with broad political and industry action – but Malmodin is more optimistic 
that this will happen than B&E and A&E. A recent Ericsson report [2020] based on 
M&E claims that ICT’s emissions could be reduced by 80% if all its electricity came 








Figure 2.4 Projections of ICT’s GHG emissions from 2020. B&E judge their exponential scenario as most realistic 
while the linear growth scenario is more conservative and reflects the impact of mitigating actions between now 
and 2040. M&L [2018] did not make concrete estimates beyond 2020, but Malmodin suggests ICT’s carbon 
footprint in 2020 could halve by 2030 – offering a 2030 estimate of 365 MtCO2e in a recent techUK talk [Malmodin, 
2020]. 
 
Differences in predictions could be due to age of data used. 
The data underlying A&E’s and B&E’s work is somewhat older4 considering ICT’s fast 
pace of development, meaning their projections are potentially based on historical 
trends that might no longer apply, such as the assumed exponential growth of energy 
consumption by data centre and networks. In contrast, M&L might better capture 
recent changes in emission trends given their estimates are based on data measured 
directly from industry.5 M&L also have the most inclusive scope in terms of ICT 
equipment, lifecycle stages and supply chain emissions considered (see Appendix 
B.2.1). 
 
However, this access to industry data inevitably comes at the price of a lack of data 
interrogatability. Part of Malmodin’s data was obtained by ICT companies under 
confidentiality agreements, preventing others from reviewing the original data and the 
model’s assumptions and calculations. There are also potential risks of conflicts of 
interest as both authors work for network operators.6  arguably makes M&L’s paper 
open to concerns that claims are less reliable due to selective reporting and 
assumptions that cannot be properly assessed. We are not suggesting that they 
cannot be trusted, but the lack of transparency makes independent data and analysis 
 
4 A&E uses some data from 2011 for data centre and networks, while B&E uses data from 2008 for 
data centres and from 2008-2012 for networks. 
5 M&L’s estimates are based on 2015 data; Malmodin’s more recent estimates provided in personal 
communication are based on data from 2018 onwards. 
6 Malmodin works for Ericsson. Lundén works for Talia. 
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difficult, and transparency is necessary for important policy decisions. As employees 
of Huawei, A&E also have potential for conflict of interest, but their study is transparent 
about their data sources, calculations and assumptions. B&E have no obvious conflict 
of interest and they use only peer-reviewed and publicly available sources. 
 
Due to the trade-off between data interrogatability and up-to-date data, it is impossible 
to judge which study makes the most reliable predictions about ICT’s future emissions 
based on methodology alone. It is possible, however, to examine their arguments and 
the underlying assumptions in order to assess which projection is more likely. 
 
2.2 ICT’s future carbon footprint: unpacking the studies’ assumptions 
In the key studies reviewed here, there is disagreement on whether or not: 
• energy efficiencies in ICT are continuing; 
• energy efficiencies in ICT are reducing ICT’s carbon footprint;  
• ICT’s carbon footprint will stabilise due to saturation in ICT; 
• data traffic is independent of ICT emissions; 
• ICT will enable emissions savings in other industries; 
• renewable energy will decarbonise ICT. 
These assumptions have a critical influence on what we can conclude about ICT’s role 
in climate change. We therefore explore the arguments on both sides of the 
assumptions next to shed some light on the most likely path of ICT’s future emissions. 
In doing so, we draw on several other much-cited sources and our consultation with 
key experts. 
 
2.2.1 Are energy efficiency improvements in ICT continuing? 
Yes, there is scope for energy efficiency improvements in ICT to continue 
There has been a long history of ICT equipment becoming more efficient (and thus 
cheaper and more productive) with time. Moore’s Law allowed the ICT industry to 
exponentially increase chips’ performance, speed and reduce their power 
consumption. The exponential improvements of processors has kept the exponential 
growth in demand partly in check in terms of energy consumption.  
 
While M&L acknowledge that Moore’s Law has slowed down since 2012, they note 
that there is usually a time lag before the effects are felt outside of research labs – 
therefore arguing that efficiencies are continuing for now. Masanet et al. [2020] argue 
that there is scope for further efficiency improvements in data centres through: 
improvements in server virtualisation; efficiency gains in servers, storage devices and 
data centre cooling technology; and the move towards large data centres that are more 
energy efficient due to efficiencies of scale and the ability to invest in AI to optimise 
energy use. 
 
For efficiency improvements in user devices, there is evidence of carbon savings from 
TVs: older, more energy-intensive CRT and plasma TVs have been replaced by more 
efficient LED TVs; and TV sales have dropped due to users now watching video on 
laptops and smartphones (B&E, Malmodin). However, smart TVs could change this 








No, energy efficiency improvements are slowing down and are not fully utilised 
Efficiency improvements might be coming to an end – a view echoed by some of the 
experts we have consulted (e.g. Peter Garraghan, Belkhir, Andrae). As transistors 
have shrunk in size and increased in speed, they have begun to heat up; this led to 
manufacturers putting a speed limit on processing in 2004. The problem now is 
‘quantum entanglement’ where transistor layers become so thin that electrons jump 
between them, making transistors increasingly unreliable [Waldrop 2016]. Other 
avenues may exist for improving efficiencies (e.g.  decreasing semiconductor use 
stage power and nanophotonics [Andrae 2020]), but possibly not on the same time 
scales [Simonite 2016] or with the same size of efficiency gains. 
 
If processor efficiencies are reaching a limit, data centres’ power consumption will 
likely rise as increasing demand will no longer be counterbalanced by increasing 
efficiency. Despite some remaining scope for further efficiency improvements, 
Masanet et al. [2020] note that there are limits to efficiency improvements and that 
energy demand will not stabilise by itself – arguing that urgent policy action and 
investment are needed to limit increases in energy use driven by increasing demand. 
Furthermore, efficiencies in ICT do not always guarantee replacement of the older, 
less efficient equipment,7 and new devices8 or user habits9 may conflict with 
replacement gains. 
 
2.2.2 Are energy efficiencies in ICT reducing ICT’s carbon footprint? 
Yes, energy efficiencies in ICT can reduce ICT’s carbon footprint 
Malmodin argues that so far, efficiency improvements are continuing, and data centre 
emissions are expected to stay at 1% of global electricity and at the same level of 
emissions as in 2015 in the next five years. Furthermore, Masanet et al. [2020] 
reported that data centres’ operational energy consumption has increased only 
marginally from 194 TWh in 2010 to 205 TWh in 2020 despite global data centre 
compute instances increasing by 550% over the same time period – showing the 
effectiveness of efficiencies in ICT. Masanet et al. [2020] also note that these efficiency 
improvements would be able to offset a doubling of data centre demand relative to 
2018; beyond that point, energy demand will rise rapidly. This is in line with what 
Belkhir [personal communication] believes, although he is less optimistic about the 
remaining scope for efficiency improvements.  
 
No, energy efficiencies drive growth in ICT’s carbon footprint due to rebound effects 
As highlighted above, ICT has seen rapid and continuous efficiency gains. Yet 
increases in demand for more computations and the number of ICT-enabled devices 
per person have outpaced these energy efficiency improvements, resulting in ICT’s 
energy consumption, and therefore ICT’s carbon footprint, growing year-on-year. This 
pattern fits with the rebound effect described by Jevons Paradox (Section 1.1) 
whereby an efficiency improvement leads to an even greater proportionate increase 
 
7 For example, the development of 5G networks while 2G, 3G and 4G networks still exist. 
8 Some new ICT devices like smart watches and smart speakers are used by people in addition to 
smartphones and laptops. Court and Sorrell [2020] also highlight the issue of incomplete substitution of 
e-materialisation trends like e-news or e-books. 
9 For example, multiple user devices in the home have led to a third of UK households watching 
separate video content simultaneously in the same room once a week [Ofcom 2017] where people may 
have watched content using the same TV before (see Appendix C). 
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in total demand, meaning total resource requirements rise rather than decrease, as is 
often assumed. While Jevons Paradox has not been proved to apply within the ICT 
industry, it is risky to assume it does not apply given historical evidence of ICT 
emissions consistently rising despite significant efficiencies in the sector (Section 2.1). 
 
It would be surprising if rebound effects in ICT – and Jevons Paradox in particular – 
were to end in the future without a foundational change [Hilty et al. 2011]. There is a 
theoretical alternative scenario (the reverse of the Jevons Paradox rebound effect) 
where stalled energy efficiency growth leads to a plateau in ICT emissions due to 
prohibitive costs as increasing demand cannot be counterbalanced by efficiency 
improvements any longer. There is little precedent for this in prior work. 
 
2.2.3 Are ICT’s emissions likely to stabilise due to saturation? 
Yes, the world will become saturated with ICT and this will stabilise ICT’s emissions 
The studies reviewed here all agree that the number of smartphones is increasing. 
According to Cisco [2020], there will be 5.7 billion mobile subscribers by 2023 – 71% 
of the world population. However, within a few years, every person on earth might 
have a smartphone and the total number might not further increase [Malmodin in 
personal communication]. There is some evidence suggesting that the average 
lifetime of smartphones is increasing too [NPD 2018], which will decrease the yearly 
embodied carbon associated with people replacing their smartphones. In addition, 
Malmodin argues that there is a limited time per day that people can be using their 
phones, theoretically capping energy consumption. The same pattern of saturation 
could be true for other ICT equipment. 
 
No, innovation will prohibit saturation in ICT 
In general, ICT companies have a strong incentive to prevent saturation from 
happening as this would cut their income growth. There is economic pressure for them 
to create new technologies for individuals and organisations to buy. An example of 
this is the increase in IoT devices which require little person time and can operate in 
the background, driving both embodied and use phase emissions from the production 
of billions of IoT devices, the networks allowing them to communicate and from data 
centres that analyse the IoT data (see Section 3.2). Other important trends (Section 
3) such as AI analytics would also escape this natural saturation. The history of ICT 
does not provide precedents for a saturation effect; it is therefore unlikely to occur 
without active intervention. Furthermore, there is still scope for more ICT infrastructure 
growth beyond smartphones before this innovation cycle even begins, e.g. for data 
centres in the Global South [Preist, personal communication]. 
 
2.2.4 Is data traffic independent of ICT emissions? 
Yes, ICT emissions are largely independent of data traffic 
The amount of data traffic on the internet at a given time does not correspond with 
simultaneous increases in ICT’s emissions. Instead, network operators plan capacity 
for peak data traffic [Sandvine 2014], meaning emissions from ICT are fixed regardless 
of the amount of data traffic until growth in peak capacity is required. In M&L’s view, 
data traffic is not directly proportional to emissions due to efficiency gains and use of 
renewable energy in data centres and networks that allow them to process 
increasingly more data with similar emissions. M&L (reiterated in [Ericsson 2020]) 
believe the energy consumption of ICT is rather linked to the number of users and time 
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spent using ICT because of the energy consumption of user devices and access 
equipment like modems and routers, and that data traffic growth is slowing down to a 
more linear than exponential growth (see Appendix B.2.5 for more details). 
 
No, data traffic drives ICT growth and the associated emissions 
A&E and B&E both agree that data traffic is a driver in ICT growth and emissions. 
Growth in the internet’s infrastructure capacity allows for new data-intensive services 
and applications; these offer more affordances to users, driving demand for the 
services and therefore further infrastructure growth [Preist et al. 2016]. Peak data 
traffic is one driver for this infrastructure growth due to increased demand for data-
intensive services; other influences include ensuring technology is always accessible 
to all users [Preist, personal communication]. 
 
Video streaming is a particularly prominent driver in data traffic (see Appendix C). 
Netflix have just agreed with EU regulators to reduce their traffic and ease the load on 
the network, allowing network provision for homeworkers during the Covid-19 
pandemic [Sweney 2020]. Belkhir [personal communication] pointed out that this 
agreement between Netflix and EU regulators makes it difficult to argue that data traffic 
is independent of ICT infrastructure growth and therefore that data traffic has little 
effect on emissions. 
 
2.2.5 Is ICT enabling carbon savings in other industries?  
Yes, ICT is enabling carbon savings in other industries 
In their report SMARTer 2030, the Global eSustainability Initiative [GeSI 2015], which 
represents ICT companies, claim that ICT could save 9.1 GtCO2e in 2020 and 12.08 
GtCO2e in 2030 in other industries such as health, education, buildings, agriculture, 
transport and manufacturing – mostly due to better efficiency. This would allow a 20% 
reduction of global CO2e emissions by 2030, holding emissions at 2015 levels and 
decoupling economic growth from emissions growth. Relative to their estimate of ICTs 
own emissions of 1.27 GtCO2e in 2020 and 1.25 GtCO2e in 2030, GeSI [2015] argue 
that ICT is net carbon negative and that governments and businesses should invest 
more into ICT. According to them, already in 2015, ICT saved 1.5 times its own 
emissions. There is also a strong argument that ICT will accelerate the use of 
renewable energy in the grid and hence lead to decarbonisation of the energy supply. 
 
No, ICT drives carbon emissions in other industries due to rebound effects 
The GeSI [2015] report is sponsored by several large ICT companies and there is a 
lack of transparency in their analysis, raising concerns over possible conflict of 
interest. So far, there is little evidence that these predictions have come true. History 
has shown us that growth in the global economy and its carbon footprint has 
continuously risen, even with ICT creating efficiencies in other industries. It is risky to 
assume that further ICT-enabled efficiencies will suddenly start to create significant 
carbon savings in the wider economy without governance and intervention. Rather, it 
is more likely that ICT enables emission increases in other sectors because it enables 
efficiencies, leading to growth in the very areas into which ICT delivers those efficiency 
gains – including growth in industries that are already carbon-intensive [Preist, 
personal communication]. By efficiencies here, it is important to note that we go 
beyond just energy-specific efficiencies as described by Jevons Paradox; rather, we 
take into account ICT’s emission impacts and rebound effects more widely [cf. 
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Börjesson Rivera et al. 2014] and refer to any potential route for rebound ICT brings 
to our society.10 
 
While GeSI [2015] mention rebound effects, this is only in the appendix and given very 
limited treatment. Their estimate of an increase of global emissions by 1.37 GtCO2e 
due to rebound effects is not included in overall calculations for emission savings by 
ICT and is almost certainly a serious underestimation. This is highlighted by their 
example of video conferencing. GeSI [2015, p. 69] estimating that “E-Work 
technologies like videoconferencing could save around 3 billion liters of fuel.” by 
cutting workers’ commutes. It is difficult to quantify the exact balance of ICT-enabled 
savings and increased emissions, but one clue is that while video traffic has been 
expanding rapidly to the extent that it is one of the main contributors of internet traffic 
[Cisco 2020], emissions from flights were simultaneously increasing (save for 
pandemics) [Graver et al. 2019]. Therefore, ICT only enables efficiencies in other 
industries if it completely substitutes more traditional carbon-intensive activities rather 
than being offered in addition to them. 
 
2.2.6 Will renewable energy decarbonise ICT? 
Yes, renewable energy will decarbonise ICT 
Whilst the exact share of renewable energy used for the ICT sector is not known, some 
ICT operators generate renewable energy on-site and the ICT sector overall is a major 
purchaser of renewable energy – leading the way for a global shift to this energy 
source. In a recent Ericsson blogpost building on Malmodin’s work, Lövehagen [2020] 
claims that ICT’s carbon footprint could be reduced up to 80% if all electricity came 
from renewable energy. Renewable energy has a much lower carbon footprint than 
fossil fuel energy at ca. 0.1 kgCO2e/kWh. Compared to 0.63 kgCO2e/kWh for the 
global electricity mix,11 a switch to 100% renewable energy would reduce emissions 
by ca. 86%. 
 
No, renewable energy is not a silver bullet 
With unlimited growth in energy demand, even the relatively small carbon footprint 
from renewable energy compared to fossil fuel would add up significantly. Additionally, 
there might be limits to the amount of renewable energy that can be generated with 
present technology, such as the availability of silver which is used in photovoltaic 
panels.12 While investments into renewable energy currently have the effect to reduce 
the price of renewable energy for other sectors, as soon as there are limits to the 
amount of renewable energy that can be generated, any additional energy used by 
ICT will take energy away from other purposes. 
 
There are also practical constraints on the extent that renewable energy can be used 
to power ICT equipment. Even data centres that are powered by 100% renewable 
 
10 For example, consider how ICT has made it far easier to book flights online, contributing to the growth 
of the aviation industry. 
11 Both figures are based on SWC’s EEIO model which draws on official data from the UK government’s 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. 
12 An average solar panel requires ca. 20g of silver [Apergis and Apergis 2019]. There are currently 
2.6bn solar panels in the world generating a total of 865 TWh [IEA 2019a]. From 2019 to 2020, 135 
TWh of solar energy was added. The manufacture of these requires 52,000 tons of silver. Worldwide, 
27,540 tons of silver are being mined in 2020, and the amount increases by ca. 2% every year [IEA 
2019a]. On this trajectory, solar panels would use 100% of global silver supplies in 2031 leaving none 
for electric car batteries and other uses.  
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energy usually have fossil fuel-powered backups for unexpected demand increases. 
Powering networks with renewable energy is a lot harder due to their decentralised 
nature [Belkhir and Elmeligi 2018] and powering user devices depends largely on the 
greening of national grids – a trend that is ongoing in the UK but still far from complete. 
Thus, while a shift to more renewable energy is crucial, it does not provide an unlimited 
supply of energy for ICT to expand into without consequences.  
 
2.2.7  Six common narratives for ICT’s role in climate change. 
The assumptions from the studies and unpacked in this section can be summarised 
into six narratives of ICT’s future role in climate change: four around future trends in 
efficiency and demand and their effect on ICT’s own emissions, and two on ICT’s effect 




Figure 2.5 Narratives of ICT’s role in climate change and the critical assumptions underlying these. A) ICT’s carbon 
footprint. B) ICT’s effects on emissions in the wider economy. The proponents of each narrative are in italics. 
Efficiency is here defined as GHG emissions per equivalent ICT use. This includes Moore’s Law but also higher 
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2.3 Summary of ICT’s carbon footprint 
To meet climate change targets, the ICT sector needs to drastically decrease its 
own emissions and deliver vast savings in other sectors. 
Despite some variability in estimates, research studies reviewed here agree that ICT 
is responsible for several percent of global GHG emissions and that its footprint 
has grown until recently. The world needs to reduce its GHG emissions in order to 
stay within 1.5°C warming [IPCC 2018]. If the ICT sector should decrease its 
emissions in line with other parts of the economy, it would have to: reduce its CO2 
emissions by 42% by 2030, 72% by 2040 and 91% by 2050 (see Figure 2.6)13  and 
net zero by 2050 [ITU 2020]; or deliver equivalent savings in other sectors in addition 
to the savings these sectors will have to deliver themselves to meet these targets, 
making sure that rebound effects do not offset these savings. 
 
Under business as usual, increases in emissions are likely. Major concerted 
effort would be needed to reduce emissions. 
All the analysts we spoke to agree that in order to decrease ICT’s emissions - even 
assuming emissions have stabilised – a strong and unified effort would be needed 
(Section 4). Without this effort, even if ICT’s emissions were to stay stable at the 2020 
level over the next decades, the relative share of ICT’s emissions in global emissions 
would increase to more than a third as other sectors reduce their emissions in line with 
1.5°C warming (see Error! Reference source not found.).  
  
Figure 2.6 ICT emissions, assuming the 2020 level (adjusted for truncation error) remains stable until 2050, and 
global CO2 emissions reduced in line with 1.5°C under scenario SSP2-19. White numbers indicate global CO2 cuts 
needed relative to 2010 and labels at the bottom indicate ICT’s share of global CO2 emissions in percent. We 
 
13 Global CO2 emission cuts to 2050 needed to stay within 1.5°C warming by 2100 are based on 
modelling by Baskerville-Muscutt [2019] based on the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 2 as outlined 
by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis, available at: 
https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/dsd?Action=htmlpage&page=40. This is the ‘middle of the road’ or 
average scenario for the trajectory the world will follow. Cuts are relative to global CO2 in 2010. Note 
that this is CO2 only, assuming ICT emissions are mostly CO2 as a large part if electricity and there 
are no agricultural components. The comparison to CO2 emissions was chosen because reliable 
budgets do not exist for GHG emissions at this point. 
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assume most of ICT's emissions are from CO2 because a large proportion of its footprint is from electricity 
consumption and there are no agricultural components. The comparison to CO2 emissions was chosen because 
reliable budgets do not exist for GHG emissions at this point. 
There are three reasons to believe that ICT’s emissions are higher than 
estimated and that they are going to increase. 
Reason 1: Rebound effects have occurred since the beginning of ICT, and they will 
likely continue without intervention. 
Even if efficiency improvements are continuing (see Section 2.2.1), this will not 
completely counterbalance growth in demand for ICT; in fact, efficiencies might spur 
further growth in emissions by allowing the ICT sector to grow further due to rebound 
effects (see Section 2.2.2). We believe that a natural peak in ICT emissions due to 
saturation of demand is unlikely (see Section 2.2.3). To the extent that ICT enables 
efficiencies in other sectors, there is the risk that rebound effects more than offset any 
savings following Global Rebounds (see Section 2.2.5). Renewable energy will help 
decarbonise ICT but is not a silver bullet (see Section 2.2.6). 
 
Reason 2: Current studies of ICT’s carbon footprint make several important omissions 
surrounding the growth trends in ICT. 
The studies reviewed here make several important omissions of growing areas of ICT, 
such as Blockchain; and IoT is only partially considered for future trends. This leads 
to an incomplete picture. Some analysts argue that Blockchain is not part of ICT 
because it requires specific hardware, not regular servers. However, we believe that 
it should be in scope of ICT as it is an ICT-facilitated algorithm (see Section 3.3); 
having specific hardware for Blockchain is similar to how graphics-specific services 
(e.g. online games) require Graphics Processing Units [Preist, personal 
communication]. M&L include some IoT (see Table B.2 in Appendix B.2.1) and 
concluded that the impact of IoT is small. However, this is a small share of all IoT and 
they only accounted for the connected devices themselves, not the energy 
consumption IoTs create in data centres and networks (based on the assumption that 
data traffic and energy are not closely related, see Section 2.2.4). Such trends, as well 
as AI, could help reduce global carbon emissions, but they will also add to ICT’s 
carbon footprint; we discuss this trade-off for prominent ICT trends in the next section 
(see Section 3). 
Reason 3: There is significant investment in developing and increasing uptake of 
Blockchain, IoT and AI. 
Despite questionable evidence that ICT growth trends will save more carbon 
emissions than it will introduce (see Section 3), Blockchain, IoT and AI are seeing 
increased investment and uptake. As we explore in Section 4, the European 
Commission discuss these trends as a way to spur economic growth and yield 
emission reductions; yet, they expect ICT will only enable 15% reductions which is 
insufficient for meeting climate change targets (see Section 4.1). Some large 
technology corporations are setting their own carbon pledges which might help reduce 
the emissions from ICT’s growth trends, however these pledges are often not 
ambitious enough to meet net zero emissions by 2050 (see Section 4.2). Until ICT 
corporations become net zero, any investment in the ICT industry will be associated 
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With a global carbon constraint, ICT will be a vital sector to ensure transition to 
a net zero world. 
If a global carbon constraint was introduced, we could be certain that rebound effects 
would not occur, meaning that productivity improvements through ICT-enabled 
efficiencies both within the ICT sector and the wider economy would be realised 
without a carbon cost. Under these conditions, ICT would be a key means by which 
productivity is maintained or increased despite the carbon constraint, and therefore 
ICT’s role in enabling the whole economy can be expected to be even greater than it 
is today. Given these reasons, under a carbon constraint, ICT’s share of global 
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3. ICT Trends: Opportunities and Threats 
Looking towards the future, three known areas of technological innovation may have 
potentially profound implications (both opportunities and threats) for the carbon 
footprint of the ICT sector: 
• Big Data, Data Science and AI; 
• The Internet of Things; 
• Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies. 
 
3.1 Big Data, Data Science and AI 
Big data is one of the most significant trends in technology, made possible by the data 
store (and computational) capacities of cloud computing. There has been enormous 
interest in making sense of this large and complex data through data science and AI. 
 
3.1.1 Opportunities 
Big data, data science and AI could contribute to a lower carbon ‘smart’ future. 
There are real opportunities around the use of big data/data science/AI alongside IoT 
in what has often been referred to as the smart future – encompassing smart grids, 
cities, logistics, agriculture, homes etc. [e.g. Al-Ali et al. 2017, Minoli et al. 2017, Reka 
and Dragicevic 2018, Saleem et al. 2019]. Big data/data science/AI could particularly 
contribute to a lower carbon future, e.g. by finding optimal routes through cities and 
reducing traffic congestion, or by optimising energy use for heating and lighting in 
buildings. As these areas rely on IoT, we defer discussion on these opportunities until 
Section 3.2. 
 
There is a willingness across industry and academia to apply such technologies 
for the benefits of society. 
There is a significant move towards data science and/or AI for social good, including 
applications in health [Raj et al. 2015] and the environment, although this work is in its 
infancy and generally not migrated to everyday practice. The role of big data in 
supporting green applications has been discussed, specifically in the areas of energy 
efficiency, sustainability and the environment [Wu et al. 2016]; and the field of 
computational sustainability is emerging, using technologies such as AI in support of 
the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals [Gomes et al. 2019]. There is 
also an emerging research community looking at the role of such technologies in 
supporting environmental sciences as they seek a deeper understanding of our 
changing natural environment.14  
 
3.1.2 Threats 
The world’s data is doubling every two years. 
Data has been described as ‘the new oil’ [James 2019] given its commercial impact – 
yet as data storage and data centres grow to meet demand for big data, this 
description could have a double meaning due to the environmental impact of 
data.  The storage and analysis of data can help solve complex world problems, but 
there are concerns over the resources required to facilitate data science and AI 
technologies, especially the carbon footprint of the underlying data centres (see 
 
14 See for example research in Toronto, Exeter and the Centre of Excellence in Environmental Data 
Science, a joint initiative between Lancaster University and UK CEH programme called ‘data science 
for social good’. 
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Section 2). By this year (2020), it is expected that the total size of the world’s digital 
data will be around 44 trillion gigabytes of data [IDC 2014]. AI and data science are 
therefore an important trend that drives growth in data storage and processing15 and 
in data centres, which some experts argue leads to an increase in ICT’s carbon 
footprint (Section 2.2.4).  
 
Emissions associated with processing this data are increasing due to growing 
computational complexity. 
Data science and AI offer additional threats over and above the potential growth of 
data centre emissions. The dominant of the two is AI with its potentially 
computationally complex underlying algorithms when operating on big data, especially 
around machine learning and deep learning. Researchers have estimated that 
284,019 kg of CO2e are emitted from training just one machine learning algorithm for 
Natural Language Processing, an impact which is five times the lifetime emissions of 
a car [Strubell et al. 2019]. Whilst this figure has been criticised as an extreme example 
of the footprint of model training,16 the carbon footprint of model training is still 
recognised as a potential issue in the future given the trends in computation growth 
for AI [Biewald 2019]: AI training computations have in fact increased by 300,000x 
between 2012-2018 (an exponential increase doubling every 3.4 months) [Amodei and 
Hernandez 2019]. 
 
3.1.3 Threat Mitigation 
Sustainability needs more consideration in ethical guidelines of AI. 
Due to this growth of computation, Schwartz et al. [2019] argue the need for ‘Green 
AI’ that focuses on increasing efficiencies of AI computations rather than the current 
focus on what they describe as ‘Red AI’, i.e. accurate AI computations without 
consideration of resource costs or efficiencies. Sustainability is currently one of the 
least represented issues associated with ethics guidelines in AI [Jobin et al. 2019], 
though a framework and ‘leaderboard’ to track the energy consumption and carbon 
emissions of machine learning research have recently been offered in the hope that 
this will encourage energy efficiency to be considered in such algorithms [Henderson 
et al. 2020]. Energy efficiencies are required in this field of ICT and opportunities to 
introduce efficiencies may exist, such as addressing the processing requirements of 
AI algorithms by using idle PCs as a distributed supercomputer [Folding@Home 
2020]. However, we reiterate the concerns of an efficiencies-focused endeavour 
without a carbon or consumption constraint due to the potential of rebound effects 
(see Section 2.2.2). 
 
3.2 The Internet of Things 
The Internet of Things (IoT), where ‘Things’ represent everyday internet-connected 
objects from wearable technologies through to appliances, cars and other transport 
vehicles. This has led to a substantial and ongoing growth of the internet as 
documented below.  
 
 
15 Data processing will be the larger contributor to ICT’s energy use, as simply storing data is 
environmentally cheap in comparison [Preist, personal communication]. 
16 A more typical case of model training may only produce around 4.5 kg of CO2 [Biewald 2019]. 
 
 




IoT technologies can enable efficiencies within and outside of the ICT sector. 
IoT applications are often viewed as ‘smart technology’, especially when combined 
with data science/AI in ways that optimise energy usage. Smart cities aim to provide 
better public services and resource use at a lower environmental cost [Mohanty et al. 
2016], e.g. location-based services from smart city IoT sensing and data analysis can 
reduce transportation pollution through more efficient driving routes [Bibri 2018]. 
Govindan et al. [2018] also investigate how such developments can support smarter 
logistics including reducing energy requirements. As mentioned in Section 2.2.5, ICT 
has the potential to decarbonise energy supply and a combination of IoT with grid 
technology has real potential to to support the management of the resultant Smart 
Grid, e.g. by dealing with intermittency of renewable supply [Collier 2015]. IoT 
deployments have been tested in schools with the aim of raising awareness of energy 
consumption and promoting sustainable behaviours based on IoT sensing data 
[Mylonas et al. 2018], and IoT has also been harnessed to enable energy efficiencies 
within ICT, e.g. by using IoT sensing data to reduce the required air conditioning for 
data centres [Liu et al. 2016]. These few examples highlight the breadth of IoT 
opportunities to reduce GHG emissions, as long as the IoT applications substitute 
more traditional carbon-intensive activities rather than act alongside them. 
 
3.2.2 Threats 
IoT enablement comes at a cost of rapidly rising numbers of devices, device 
traffic, and associated emissions. 
Despite these opportunities, the sheer number of IoT devices and the associated data 
traffic is growing significantly. Innovation in IoT is expected to create a fivefold increase 
from 15.41 billion internet-connected devices in 2015 to 75.44 billion in 2025 [Statista 
Research Department 2016]. Cisco estimate Machine-to-Machine (M2M) connections 
will grow from 6.1 billion in 2018 to 14.7 billion by 2023 (a Compound Annual Growth 
Rate (CAGR) of 19%), representing 1.8 M2M connections per member of the global 
population in 2023 [Cisco 2020]. The majority of these connections is expected to be 
formed by IoT in the home for automation, security and surveillance (48% of 
connections by 2023), yet connected cars (30% CAGR between 2018-2023) and cities 
(26% CAGR) are the fastest-growing sectors of IoT application [Cisco 2020]. 
 
IoT’s carbon footprint is under-explored, but will have significant implications 
for embodied emissions. 
Whilst the footprint of IoT is uncertain and often unexplored in studies of ICT carbon 
emissions (Section 2.3), it has been estimated that the energy footprint of IoT 
semiconductor manufacturing alone might be 556 TWh in 2016 and increase 18-fold 
to 722 TWh in 2025 [Das 2019].17 Assuming a global electricity mix of 0.63 
MtCO2e/TWh, this would be a total of 424 MtCO2e in 2016 and 6,125 MtCO2e in 2025 
for the manufacture and use of the semiconductors; this is without emissions from the 
entire IoT device, associated sensors and the emissions in data centres and networks 
that IoT communicate with. It is also worth noting that the introduction of IoT could 
 
17 This does not include other aspects of embodied carbon in IoT, such as material extraction and 
transport, or sources of GHG emissions other than electricity. This also does not consider energy use 
of running systems, although Das [2019] estimates that this would be a lot smaller than the embodied 
carbon in manufacturing, at perhaps 118 TWh in 2016 and decreasing to only 1 TWh in 2025 as we 
see more energy efficient technologies. This study has been questioned as vastly overestimated, 
however, by Malmodin [personal communication]. 
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lead to an initial rise in obsolescence for other non-ICT products, as society makes 
the transition to an IoT-focused life (e.g. replacing a working kettle with an internet-
connected kettle). 
 
3.2.3 Threat Mitigation 
Lower energy IoT systems are a way forward, but may lead to energy-
intensification and fuel greater emissions overall. 
Researchers are already looking to create lower energy IoT systems, considering both 
devices [Kaur and Sood 2015] and communication technologies. One focus is on Low 
Power Wide Area Networks (LPWANs) [Raza et al. 2017] to reduce the energy 
requirements of M2M communication, but at a trade-off of lower bandwidth. There is 
an associated field of study referred to as ‘Green IoT’ [e.g. see Shaikh et al. 2017, 
Arshad et al. 2017, Alsamhi et al. 2019, Solanki and Nayyar 2019], which focuses on 
ensuring that IoT’s own efficiencies and environmental costs are considered as we 
move towards a smarter society and environment. Yet we should be careful of IoT 
applications which could lead to rebound effects. For example, smart home 
technologies have the potential to reduce energy consumption (e.g. through remote-
controlled heating or lighting), but could perhaps lead to “energy-intensification” once 
adopted through offering new services (e.g. pre-heating homes, continuously running 
security systems) or intensifying current services (e.g. internet connectivity, 
audio/visual entertainment) [Wilson et al. 2017] – the latter adding to ICT’s carbon 
footprint through additional user devices and data traffic. 
 
3.3 Blockchain and Cryptocurrencies 
Blockchain is an example of a decentralised algorithm designed to avoid a centralised 
authority or central point of failure. Blockchain allows for potentially important new 
uses, e.g. for decentralised financial systems. Cryptocurrencies are the most popular 




Blockchain could offer some opportunities for reducing carbon, but there are 
no emissions-reducing applications of these technologies yet. 
A decentralised electronic currency could offer a real disruption in the management of 
market transactions and in the possibility of handling decentralised energy 
exchanges [Enerdata 2018], although there are no real examples of demonstrable 
emissions savings yet. Kouhizadeh and Sarkis [2018] discuss the potential of 
Blockchain technologies to enhance sustainability in the supply chain, for example by 
supporting transparency in the early stages of supply chain management (e.g. vendor 
selection and evaluation); this work, however, is speculative at this stage, leading to 
researchers offering directions to further explore adoption of Blockchain in this 








The energy consumed by single cryptocurrency is equivalent to that of entire 
nations. 
Blockchain is underwritten by energy: the algorithm, if based on ‘Proof of Work', 
creates high levels of replication and redundant computation [Mora et al. 2018].18 
Energy consumption can also increase through escalation of the ‘mining arms race’ 
due to improving risk sharing for Proof of Work Blockchains [Cong et al. 2019]. 
Focusing specifically on cryptocurrencies, one study indicates that Bitcoin’s annual 
electricity requirements of 68.7 TWh in 2020 are equivalent to powering 7 million US 
households [Digiconomist 2019], associated with a footprint of 44 MtCO2.19 Due to the 
inefficiency of transactions, a single transaction could be ca. 750 kWh, enough to 
power 23 households for one day [Digiconomist 2019], or 473 kgCO2e.19 Bitcoin 
currently has a market dominance of 64% of all cryptocurrencies [CoinMarketCap 
2020]. Under the assumption that other cryptocurrencies have the same carbon 
intensity as Bitcoin, the carbon footprint of all cryptocurrencies would be ca. 69 
MtCO2e, 0.1% of global emissions. Another study estimated the Bitcoin network 
consumption at 2.55 gigawatts (GW) of electricity in 2018 (a value which is nearly as 
much as Ireland at 3.1 GW), but that this could rise to 7.67 GW in the future (making 
it comparable to Austria at 8.2 GW) [de Vries 2018]. Other researchers argue an 
annual electricity consumption of 48.2 TWh and annual carbon emissions ranging from 
23.6-28.8 MtCO2 for Bitcoin in 2018 [Stoll et al. 2019]. Stoll et al. also estimated that 
other cryptocurrencies would add another 70 TWh in 2018, bringing the total carbon 
footprint to ca. 73 MtCO2e in 2018. 
 
3.3.3 Threat Mitigation 
Fiscal policy intervention may be needed to mitigate energy consumption of 
decentralised algorithms. 
Alternatives to Proof of Work exist that reduce the number of resources required for 
Blockchain, e.g. Proof of Stake reduces computation and Byzantine protocols remove 
consensus mining [Monrat et al. 2019, Saleh 2020]. Carbon offset mechanisms for 
Blockchain also exist, such as SolarCoin whereby solar energy producers are 
rewarded with a free SolarCoin for each MWh of solar-based electricity they produce 
[Howson 2019]. Renewable energy can also be used to power these technologies and 
it is argued to form 73% of Bitcoin’s mining [Bendiksen and Gibbons 2019].20 However, 
de Vries [2019] does not think Bitcoin can be sustainable due to: 1) the seasonality of 
hydropower in Sichuan, China (a region which supposedly supports nearly half of 
global mining capacity [Bendiksen et al. 2018]) meaning energy is required from 
alternative sources such as coal; and 2) the e-waste associated with mining 
machines21 once they reach their end-of-life, estimated at an annual 10,948 metric 
tons (comparable to Luxembourg at 12 kt) assuming Koomey’s efficiencies law 
[Koomey et al. 2011]. Despite being the most popular use of Blockchain technology, 
 
18 The methodology and assumptions behind the Mora et al. [2018] projections of Blockchain’s future 
energy use have been questioned by Masanet et al. [2019], but Proof of Work is widely accepted to be 
energy-intensive. 
19 Based on a global average electricity intensity of 0.63 kgCO2e/kWh. This is likely an underestimate 
since Bitcoin is likely powered by a higher share of coal than the global average [Stoll et al. 2019]. 
20 Note that CoinShares Research who published the report run a cryptocurrency investment fund, so 
there is a potential conflict of interest. 
21 If the cryptocurrency collapses, mining machines cannot be repurposed as a generic data centre 
since they are so specialised [Preist, personal communication]. 
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there are, and will continue to be, Blockchain applications beyond Bitcoin and 
cryptocurrencies. To mitigate the energy consumption of Blockchain technologies and 
applications, Truby [2018] has proposed a series of fiscal policy options.22 
 
3.4 Summary 
If unchecked, ICT trends could drive exponential growth in GHG emissions. 
The three trends discussed above lead to growth in the three core areas of ICT (see 
Figure 3.1).23 Whilst we have discussed the trends independently above, it’s important 
to note that these trends are in fact interlinked. For example, IoT involves collecting 
more sensing data, requiring more data analytics and adding to the issue of big data, 
data science and AI, with the potential to further increase ICT’s emissions. Such 
growth trends will also be facilitated through innovations in the ICT infrastructure, e.g. 
the move from 4G to 5G cellular networks would enable faster, data-intensive network 
transmissions for IoT devices - allowing for even more sensing data to be collected 
and analysed for big data, data science and AI. If not restrained, these above trends 
all have potential to help drive further exponential growth, unlikely to be outweighed 
by the ICT-enabled carbon reductions in other sectors. 
 
Figure 3.1 The threats that trends in ICT have on emissions from data centres, networks and devices. Note that 
stronger lines depict prominent threats, weaker lines depict secondary threats, and the dotted lines depict the links 
between the trends. 
 
Covid-19 has shown a consumption constraint that could disrupt these trends. 
As many activities have been restricted or avoided during the pandemic, ICT has 
shown the significant benefits and value it can bring to society – allowing families to 
communicate, people to work from home, and conferences to be held online. Under 
these circumstances, ICT serves as a substitution rather than an addition to our 
regular activities. Coinciding with this, there has been a temporary drop in carbon 
emissions.24  The key question is what society will do when the Covid-19 crisis is over. 
Will the world: embrace some of these new ways of living and working instead of their 
traditional counterparts and reap the carbon benefits, return to our old ways, or create 
a mix of the two? 
 
 
22 For example, introducing a customs duty or excise tax on imports of miners’ verification devices 
based on its energy consumption [Truby 2018].  
23 Note that in this section we expand ‘user devices’ to ‘devices’ to include embedded devices. 
24  A recent study in Nature estimates that daily global CO2 emissions temporarily decreased by 17% 
in early April relative to 2019 levels, largely due to changed transport and consumption levels, and that 
2020 annual emissions could decrease by 4% if restrictions remain in place until the end of 2020 and 
7% if restrictions end in June relative to 2019 [Le Quéré et al., 2020]. However, this is negligible if it 
does not lead to lasting changes after the pandemic. 
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There are important policy decisions to be made which determine the future of 
ICT’s carbon footprint. 
There is an increasing awareness of the impacts of ICT, but we note the need to 
expand our awareness to the full range of narratives and their underlying assumptions 
(see Section 2.2). We also note that ICT and its trends can bring a lot of value to many 
people worldwide. We are very much at a crossroads in terms of the choices we make, 
and there are some positive signals.25 Without a global carbon constraint, avoiding 
unsustainable growth trends in ICT becomes a debate of what we should prioritise in 
the ICT sector, what problems can and should be solved using computing, and who 
can access the required ICT resources for such solutions – supporting valued use of 
ICT (for example, for uses that lead to carbon reductions in the economy) whilst 
constraining consumption and minimising the ICT sector’s carbon footprint. An 
example of such prioritisation in practice is the recent Netflix agreement with EU 
regulators to reduce its bit rate to ease the burden on internet traffic during the Covid-
19 outbreak, enabling more people to work online from home [Sweney 2020]. This in 
turn places the spotlight on policy makers and governance structures at all levels, 
including in industry, governments, and academia. We look at this important issue in 




25 For example, in AI research, there have been calls for the EU to incentivise AI applications which are 
“socially preferable (not merely acceptable) and environmentally friendly (not merely sustainable but 
favourable to the environment)”, recognising the need for a methodology to assess these characteristics 
[Floridi et al. 2019]. 
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4. Current Policy Developments and Governance in ICT 
In this section, we provide the following: 
• an overview of European policy developments in ICT; 
• a summary of ICT emissions self-regulation in top technology companies. 
 
4.1 European Policy and ICT 
Europe is leading the world in implementation of and experimentation with climate 
policy [Delbeke and Vis 2016]; therefore, our analysis focuses on documentation 
produced by the European Commission (EC). Note that while the UK had been 
involved in the formulation of the European Green Deal, they may be backing away 
from some of these commitments post-Brexit. 
  
ICT is a central pillar of Europe’s climate strategy. 
Under the European Commission's (EC’s) Green Deal, Europe is committed to 
becoming carbon neutral by 2050, and climate neutral later this century26 [European 
Commission 2018a]. ICT features prominently in policymaking around the climate: 1) 
because of recent efforts to lead the world in a sustainable, human-centric approach 
to innovation [European Commission 2019d], and 2) to drive down GHGs across the 
economy.  
 
European ICT emissions policy emphasises efficiency, renewables and circular 
waste. 
The EC’s official figures put ICT’s current share of global GHG emissions at more than 
2% [European Commission 2020c], and a study commissioned by the EC anticipates 
that "the energy consumption of data centres and telecommunication networks will 
grow with an alarming rate of 35% and 150% respectively over 9 years" (from 2018) 
[PEDCA 2015]. Rather than seeking to directly affect this consumption trend, the clear 
policy focus is mitigating the impacts associated with rising consumption, specifically 
through improved efficiency and renewable energy. Three fundamental assumptions 
are evident in this approach: 
• there is scope for energy efficiency improvements in ICT to continue, at least 
through 2050 (Section 2.2.1); 
• energy efficiencies in ICT can reduce ICT’s carbon footprint (Section 2.2.2); 
• renewable energy will decarbonise ICT (Section 2.3.6). 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3, there are strong arguments against each of these 
premises which may impede successful decarbonisation of ICT unless simultaneously 
curbing demand or adding a global carbon constraint. However, publicly facing policy 
statements do not attend to these counter-assumptions. 
 
Data centres are a particular focus of European policy. The EC has committed to 
carbon-neutral data centres by 2030, through a mixture of continued efficiency 
improvements, transitioning toward reliance on renewable energy sources, and 
developing methods of reusing the heat that servers generate [Kayali et al. 2020]. This 
 
26 The EC use the term ‘carbon neutral’ to refer to no net emissions of carbon dioxide, and the term 
‘climate neutral’ to refer to no net emissions of GHG emissions. This is different from the way most 
ICT companies use the term ‘carbon neutral’, which includes all GHG emissions, see Appendix H. 
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is an ambitious proposal, as currently there is no indication that data centre emissions 
are decreasing despite continuous efficiency improvements (see Section 2.1). The EC 
also does not specify whether this must be achieved through on-site renewables or 
can include purchasing of offsets (see Appendix H for why this matters). 
 
Other noteworthy policy covers e-waste, which is recognised by the World Economic 
Forum as the fastest growing category of waste [World Economic Forum 2019]. As 
part of Europe’s New Circular Economy Action Plan, the EC plans to put forward a 
‘Circular Electronics Initiative’ by the end of 2021 to improve the lifespan, repairability 
and recyclability of ICT products [European Commission 2020d]. This initiative would 
help decrease the embodied carbon of ICT but would be partly offset if the total 
number of devices continues to increase (i.e. innovation will prohibit saturation in ICT; 
see Section 2.2.3). 
  
Except for this Circular Electronics Initiative, which will likely include a reward scheme 
for consumers who recycle their old devices [European Commission 2020a], the 
Green Deal is notable for its lack of clear incentivisation or enforcement mechanisms 
regarding decarbonisation of ICT. It may be believed that efficiency naturally improves 
as technology advances (e.g. through Moore's Law), and/or that market forces will 
compel industry to drive these improvements, as there is no discussion of either 
penalties to be applied or assistance to be offered to the sector toward achieving 
carbon neutrality by 2050. Also not provided within the Green Deal are estimates of 
the emissions reductions needed within the ICT sector to meet this ambition, which 
may be incompatible with continuing growth expected of ICT's electricity consumption 
(see Section 2.1).  
 
Europe seeks to supercharge enablement through significant investment in ICT. 
While policies clearly acknowledge ICT's share of global emissions and commit to 
reducing them as much as possible, the primary thrust of Europe's climate strategy is 
the use of ICT to enable emissions savings in other industries. An EC commissioned 
report states vaguely that ICT “probably saves more energy than it consumes” 
[PEDCA 2015]. The wording of the Green Deal, however, is unambiguous: “Digital 
technologies are a critical enabler for attaining the sustainability goals of the Green 
deal in many different sectors” [European Commission 2019a]. This includes various 
initiatives and major funding schemes intended to foster innovation in and uptake of 
AI, IoT and Blockchain (see Appendix F). 
 
The Green Deal does not provide a detailed roadmap for how these technologies will 
deliver against these goals, nor figures regarding expected savings to be achieved 
from these technologies. These are undoubtedly difficult to estimate, but as there is 
no evidence in the multi-decade history of ICT-driven efficiency savings that 
enablement works for reducing overall emissions (see Section 2.2.5), in the absence 
of an intervention such as the introduction of a global carbon constraint, claims of the 
feasibility of this strategy should be approached with skepticism. As a baseline, staying 
below 1.5°C warming would require the global economy to reduce by 42% by the year 
2030, including the ICT sector (see Section 2.3); so if ICT's emissions do not shrink 
by 42% by 2030, then it would have to enable reductions in other sectors – beyond 
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This may prove a delicate balancing act. To facilitate this work, complete and accurate 
estimates of ICT’s footprint need to be captured regularly, alongside careful 
accounting of the emissions ICT is driving or saving in other sectors, with sector 
targets adjusted accordingly to ensure regional and global targets are met. 
 
We note the competing policy priorities of the EC. Europe faces pressures to remain 
competitive in the global technology market and seeks to lead the way in rapidly 
growing technologies that would otherwise be capitalised by Asian and US 
competitors [Palmer 2019]. By stimulating innovation in these areas, Europe seeks to 
maintain both the health of its economy and the health of the planet. In the current 
policy environment, economic growth would likely further spur consumption and 
therefore emissions. 
 
4.2 Self-regulation within the ICT industry 
Companies need net zero carbon targets that cover supply chain emissions. 
Several big ICT companies have recently announced carbon pledges to self-regulate 
their emissions (e.g. Amazon, Apple, BT, Microsoft, Sky). These pledges fall into three 
main categories (see Appendix G for detail): 1) carbon neutral (least ambitious); 2) net 
zero; and 3) carbon negative (most ambitious). To limit global warming to 1.5°C 
[IPCC 2018], we will need to reach net zero emissions by 2050 globally [Pineda and 
Faria 2019]. Companies should aim for net zero or, even better, carbon negative, to 
make this possible; carbon neutral targets are not enough because they do not cover 
supply chain emissions (see Appendix G.5 for more details). Yet only a few firmly aim 
to be net zero (e.g. Microsoft, Sky, Amazon, BT) and only Microsoft aims to be carbon 
negative [Smith 2020].  
 
Carbon offsetting requires truly additional carbon removal methods. 
Companies need to prioritise reducing the total emissions as much as possible 
[Stephens 2019] – only then should the rest of their emissions be offset by permanent, 
verifiable and additional carbon removal methods. For a company’s emissions to be 
truly offset, the same amount of carbon that the company emits needs to be removed 
from the atmosphere (e.g. through afforestation, reforestation, planting seagrass, 
taking in landfill gas), not simply avoided.27 However, only 2% of offsets result in truly 
additional removals [Cames et al. 2016]. Furthermore, some offsetting projects may 
not be permanent. For example, where forests or peatlands are used to sequester 
carbon, these carbon stores must be protected from fires or logging – otherwise the 
carbon removals are negated. Efficiency enablement cannot count as offsetting 
because it is hard to show that any enabled savings are not negated by rebound 
effects (see Section 2.2.5).  
 
Only some renewable energy helps to cut emissions.  
Some companies also claim, or aim for, power provision from 100% renewable energy 
without specifying whether they aim to cut emissions (see Appendix G.4). Companies 
need to detail which type of renewable energy they use (e.g. biofuels, solar, wind, 
 
27 An example of an avoided emission offset is an area of forest that is protected from logging; the 
amount of carbon that would have been released if the forest was cut down is counted as offset. 
However, there needs to be some certainty that it would have been removed if it had not been 
purchased, otherwise these offsets cannot be considered additional. Even genuine ‘avoided’ emissions 
may end up ‘leaking’ out at another point in the system, (e.g. a protected area of forest may just lead to 
more logging somewhere else in the world) [Childs 2019].  
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hydro), and what proportion of their renewable energy comes from on-site renewable 
power generation, Power Purchasing Agreements (PPAs) and Renewable Energy 
Guarantees of Origin (REGOs), as these differ in their additionality (see Appendix H). 
For a company to claim they are 100% renewable, they should source 100% of their 
energy through PPAs, on-site renewables and investment in off-site projects but not 
unbundled REGOs, because the latter cannot claim additionality. Renewable energy 
projects should not be considered a removal but rather a scope 2 reduction (see 
Section 2.2.6). 
  
The new ITU standard encourages ICT companies to become net zero by 2050.  
In collaboration with GSMA, GeSI and SBTi, the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) [2020], a UN agency focused on the ICT industry, released a new 
standard in February 2020 that aims to reduce ICT’s GHG emissions by 45% by 2030, 
and net zero by 2050, in line with limiting global warming to 1.5°C.28 The 
‘voluntary’ standard comes with reduction targets for each ICT sub-sector for the next 
decade.29 Data centre operators adopting the science-based target will need to 
reduce emissions by at least 53%, mobile network operators by 45% and fixed network 
operators by 62% [GeSI 2015]. The targets have been approved by the SBTi and 
require companies to set targets for scope 1 and 2 emissions and some supply chain 
scope 3 (see Appendix G.2). Most of these reductions between 2020 and 2030 are 
expected to come from a shift to more renewable and other low-carbon energy. The 
targets are less ambitious than pledges by some individual companies such BT, Sky 
and Microsoft which commit to reach net zero by 2030 or 2040 already, but they send 
a strong signal that the world needs net zero and science-based targets and provide 
a template that policy makers could adopt.  
 
4.3 Summary 
Regulation and changes to climate strategies are required to ensure the ICT 
sector keeps in line with the 1.5°C limit.  
Estimations of ICT-enabled emissions savings in other sectors fall short of what is 
required for meeting agreed targets, and there is a risk that ICT's expansion into other 
sectors could increase those sectors’ emissions (see Section 4.1). This fundamentally 
calls into question the presumed role of efficiency within climate strategy. There is 
clear need to detail sector by sector the savings ICT is expected to produce – reflecting 
careful balancing of sector footprints within the contexts of regional and global targets 
– along with developing a detailed roadmap toward delivering on those expectations. 
As part of these calculations, the full impacts of ICT need to be considered 
systematically – particularly using methods that allow for objective, high-quality, up-to-
date data and analysis (i.e. rectifying the issues of current estimates, see Section 
2.1).  Policy-enforced carbon caps on global emissions, or carbon pricing for all 
industries, would help avoid the risk of Global Rebounds; but without a global carbon 
constraint, policies will be needed to enforce credible and ambitious carbon pledges 
within the ICT sector (see Section 4.2). We have outlined below five 
criteria specifically for ICT sector targets, all of which will need to pervade 
the ICT sector and be subjected to tough, well-resourced, and independent scrutiny:   
 
28 The scope of ITU’s recommendation includes ‘mobile networks, fixed networks, 
data centres, enterprise networks, and end-user devices, but excludes ICT services.’ 
29 Sub-sectors are defined as per other ITU documentation, specifically clauses A2 to 
A6 of ITU-TL.1450 (https://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?id=13581). 
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1. Targets should be inclusive of scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions;  
2. Reduction trajectories should be in line with IPCC recommendations for limiting 
warming to 1.5°C;  
3. Where transition to renewable energy is part of the decarbonisation pathway, a 
careful test should be applied that the renewables are provably additional;  
4. Emissions offsets need to pass tests of permanence, verifiability and 
additionality;  
5. Where ‘net zero’ or ‘carbon neutral’ targets are announced, these should be 
disaggregated into an emissions reduction component and an 
offsetting component so that offsets are not allowed to 
replace reduction responsibilities; 
6. Emission reduction targets should not be replaced by enablement claims due 
to the risk of rebound effects. 
 
Self-regulation may not be enough to cut CO2 emissions.  
With growing awareness of the climate emergency, public pressure may be enough to 
get more ICT companies to announce net zero emissions by 2050. However, there is 
a lack of net zero pledges thus far.  Some companies which have pledged net zero 
are not on target, or do not have detailed and transparent action plans. Note that this 
piecemeal approach of individual companies making commitments also comes at a 
competitive cost for the foreriders, with others gaining financially from being free of 
such commitments. The way forward for a reduction in ICT’s emissions is a sector-
wide commitment to net zero that is enforced through incentives and compliance 
mechanisms, such as procurement clauses that set out carbon criteria and 
consequences for non-compliance. We flag this as an important issue for the sector 
but detailed consideration of the form of regulation is beyond the scope of this report. 
We also note that an ICT-focused net zero commitment is unlikely to limit the 
emissions from ICT’s impact on the wider economy, unless upstream scope 3 
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5.  Conclusion 
As we have explored in this report, there are two central issues for the ICT industry 
with respect to the climate emergency: ICT’s own carbon footprint; and ICT’s carbon 
impact on the rest of the global economy. There has been surprisingly little research 
into these questions given their significance in response to climate change. The 
evidence that does exist needs to be interpreted with awareness of problems arising 
from the following issues: 1) the age of the data; 2) a lack of data interrogatability; 3) 
a potential for conflict of interest (especially where researchers are employed by ICT 
companies, and data and analysis is not freely available); and 4) varying approaches 
to, and lack of agreement on, the boundaries of the analysis of specifically what 
constitutes the ICT industry in terms of inclusion in estimates of its carbon footprint 
(e.g. whether or not growth trends in ICT such as Blockchain are included, how scope 
3 emissions in the supply chain are included to avoid truncation error). 
   
Historically we can be sure that four phenomena have gone hand in hand: ICT has 
become dramatically more efficient; ICT’s footprint has risen to account for a 
significant proportion of global emissions; ICT has delivered increasingly wide-ranging 
efficiency and productivity improvements to the global economy; and global emissions 
have risen inexorably.  
   
Looking to the future, our concerns are that this growth in emissions will continue at a 
time when emissions must shrink considerably. All analyses reviewed in this report 
concur that ICT is not on a path to reduce emissions in line with recommendations 
from climate science unless additional steps are taken by the sector, or legislators, to 
ensure that this happens. Prevalent policy emphasis on efficiency improvements, use 
of renewables and circular electronics is likely insufficient to reverse ICTs growth in 
emissions. There are real concerns that the period governed by Moore’s Law is 
coming to an end, and there is huge investment in trends that can significantly increase 
the carbon footprint of ICT, including in AI, IoT and Blockchain. Recently there are 
encouraging signs that some ICT giants may be moving in a positive direction (e.g. 
through net zero and carbon negative targets that include their supply chains). Our 
hope is that with the right policy to enforce these commitments, ICT companies will be 
able to deliver on their pledges and that other industries will follow ICT’s example, 
allowing us to stay within 1.5°C warming. 
   
Based on the evidence available, it is also key that regulators move away from the 
presumption that ICT saves more emissions than it produces. While ICT offers 
opportunities to enable reductions in GHG emissions in other sectors, evidence does 
not support their ability to achieve the sustained significant carbon savings we require 
by 2050. And whilst ICT might make lower carbon living possible (as the Covid-19 
pandemic demonstrates), this will not in itself help to bring about a cut in carbon. The 
argument of enablement simply does not exempt the ICT sector from addressing its 
own emissions, and the sector could certainly do more to understand its enablement 
and rebound effects. To ensure current technologies have a truly positive impact on 
the environment, the climate emergency requires a global constraint such as a carbon 
cap on extraction, a price on carbon emissions, or (as Covid-19 has temporarily 
engineered) a constraint on consumption, to rule out rebounds in emissions. 
 
Given the historical trends, in the absence of strong evidence that the conditions 
resulting in those trends have fundamentally altered, there is a significant risk that the 
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efficiency gains sought through increased application of ICT solutions will not only fail 
to lower emissions, but may in fact spur even higher emissions. At the very least it 
would seem unsafe to assume that ICT efficiencies bring about carbon savings by 
default. Efficiency is important and, in a carbon-constrained and perhaps consequently 
energy-constrained world, efficiency may well become more highly valued than ever 
before since it will be the only means to grow or even maintain productivity; this would 
mean the ICT industry could become an even larger part of the global economy as a 
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Table A.1 Definitions for terms used throughout the report. Unless a reference is provided, these are pulled or 
adapted from the Cambridge Dictionary [2020] or Berners-Lee [2011]. 
Term Definition 
1.5°C 1.5 degrees Celsius global warming has far fewer climate-
related risks in terms of sea level rise, drought, hot weather 
and precipitation extremes than 2 degrees Celsius. For this 
reason, world leaders agreed to limit global warming to 
well-below 2 degrees Celsius and ‘in pursuit’ of 1.5 degrees 
Celsius at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change 
Conference in Paris [IPCC 2018]. 




The study of how to produce machines that have some of 
the qualities that the human mind has, such as the ability to 
understand language, recognize pictures, solve problems, 
and learn. 




A set of mathematical instructions or rules that, especially if 
given to a computer, will help to calculate an answer to a 
problem.  
Augmented reality Images produced by a computer and used together with a 
view of the real world. 
Big data Very large sets of data that are produced by people using 
the internet, and that can only be stored, understood, and 
used with the help of special tools and methods. 
Bitcoin A type of cryptocurrency. 
Blockchain A decentralised algorithm. In the context of 
cryptocurrencies: a system used to make a digital record of 
all the occasions a cryptocurrency is bought or sold, and 
that is constantly growing as more blocks are added. 
Cap and trading 
scheme (for carbon) 
A cap is set on the total amount of certain GHGs that can 
be emitted. Within this cap, companies buy or receive 
emission allowances, which they can trade with one 
another. At the end of the year, a company must give up 
enough allowances that cover all its emissions or face a 
fine. Any spare allowances can be kept to cover future 
emissions or sold to other companies. 
Carbon A shorthand for all the different global-warming greenhouse 
gases. 
Carbon footprint A best estimate for the full climate change impact of 
something, including all greenhouse gases, expressed in 
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carbon dioxide equivalent (the amount of carbon dioxide 
that would have the same impact as the specific 
greenhouse gas associated with a thing); the central 
climate change metric. 
Carbon intensity The amount of greenhouse gas emissions associated with 
an activity. 
Carbon negative The process by which an activity sequesters more 
greenhouse gas emissions than are emitted through said 
activity. 
Carbon neutral Releasing no net greenhouse gas emissions into the 
atmosphere. Typically achieved by reducing emissions and 
using offsets to counterbalance any emissions generated. 
Climate change Changes in the earth's weather, including changes in 
temperature, wind patterns, and rainfall, especially the 
increase in the temperature of the earth's atmosphere that 
is caused by the increase of particular gases, especially 
carbon dioxide. 
Cloud computing The use of services, computer programs, etc. that are on 
the internet rather than ones that you buy and put on your 
computer. 
CO2 Carbon dioxide, the most common greenhouse gas. 
CO2e Carbon dioxide equivalent. Different greenhouse gases 
have different global warming potentials. CO2e expresses 
the climate change impact of all greenhouse gases emitted 
in association with an activity as the amount of carbon 
dioxide that would have the same climate change impact. 
Cryptocurrency A digital currency produced by a public network, rather than 
any government, that uses cryptography to make sure 
payments are sent and received safely. 
Data centre A place where a number of computers that contain large 
amounts of information can be kept safely. 
Data science The use of scientific methods to obtain useful information 
from computer data, especially large amounts of data. 
Data traffic/Internet 
traffic 
The activity of data and messages passing through an 
online communication system or the number of visits to a 
particular website. 
Decarbonising Reducing the carbon footprint of an activity. 
Dematerialisation  Reducing the amount of material needed to produce a 
product. 




The impact the ICT industry has on other industries, for 
example through allowing for efficiencies, providing 
additional products and/or replacing more traditional 
technologies, but also allowing intensified activity or growth 
in other areas of the economy. The effect can be both to 
increase or decrease impact and those other industries. 
Differentiated from ICT’s impact within the ICT industry. 
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The net effect of ICT depends on the impact it has in both 
areas and their balance. 
Emissions A shorthand for greenhouse gas emissions. 
Entertainment and 
Media (E&M) sector 
A sector category used by Malmodin and colleagues; it 
covers TV, consumer electronics (such as cameras and 
audio systems in a car and portable GPS) and print media. 
Environmentally 
Extended Input Output 
(EEIO) analysis  
A “top-down” approach for estimating life cycle emissions, 
capable of capturing impacts from the entire supply chain. 
See Appendix F for details. 
Embedded 
device/system 
A computer system that does a particular task inside a 
machine or larger electrical system, or physical object. 
Embodied 
carbon/emissions 
The greenhouse gas emissions released from the 
extraction of raw materials required, the manufacturing 
process and transport and distribution of a product. It 
includes a share of all the activities required to take goods 
and services at the point of sale, but excludes the product 
use phase. It can be from cradle to factory gate, from cradle 
to site of use or from cradle to grave – in the latter case, 
end of life emissions are included. In this report, we 
assume cradle to point of sale unless otherwise stated. 
Enablement The avoidance of emissions in the wider economy through 
ICT applications, including through improved efficiency. 
End of life emissions 
(see lifecycle stages) 
Emissions after disposal of a product, after the end of the 
use phase. 
Energy footprint The amount of energy used by a product, activity or 
industry. 
Exponential growth A rate of increase which becomes quicker and quicker as 
the thing that increases becomes larger. 
Fossil fuel Fuels, such as gas, coal, and oil, that were formed 
underground from plant and animal remains millions of 
years ago. 
GB (Gigabytes) A unit of computer information consisting of 1,000,000,000 
bytes. 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, or emissions 
for short 
Gases that contribute to global warming, including carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
fluorinated gases. 
ICT’s own impact The impact the ICT industry has in terms of its energy use 
or GHG emissions through the entire lifecycle of its 
products, including their manufacture, operation and 
disposal. Differentiated from the effect ICT has on other 




The use of computers and other electronic equipment and 
systems to collect, store, use, and send data electronically. 
Internet of Things (IoT) Objects with computing devices in them that are able to 
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Life Cycle Analysis 
(LCA) 
The detailed study of the series of changes that a product, 
process, activity, etc. goes through during its existence and 




transport, use phase, 
end of life) 
The stages of resource use and environmental releases 
associated with an industrial system from the extraction of 
raw materials from the Earth and the production and 
distribution, through the use, and reuse, and final disposal 
of a product. 
Machine-to-Machine 
(M2M) communication 
The act of sending data between machines or computers. 
Machine Learning (ML) The process of computers changing the way they carry out 
tasks by learning from new data, without a human being 
needing to give instructions in the form of a program. 
Moore’s Law The observation by Gordon Moore of Intel Corporation that 
the cost of a computer chip for a particular amount of 




A field of Artificial Intelligence that gives the machines the 
ability to read, understand and derive meaning from human 
languages [Lopez Yse 2019]. 
Net zero Having no net climate change impact through greenhouse 
emissions in a company’s value chain. This is achieved by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the value chain and 
removing the remaining emissions 
through additional carbon removals. 
Network A number of computers that are connected together so that 
they can share information. 
Offset A mechanism to negative a certain amount of GHG 
emissions either through avoiding emissions 
elsewhere (e.g. through protecting a forest from logging) or 
removing emissions form the atmosphere (for 
example through natural carbon sequestration, such as 
peatland restoration or reforestation projects). There is 
debate whether avoided emissions should count 
as additional and whether they are permanent. 
Operational emissions See use phase emissions. 
Operator activities Activities by operators of manufacturing plants, data 
centres and networks, such as office heating and lighting, 
business travel, maintenance of equipment, a share of 
which should be allocated to the lifecycle emissions of 
equipment using data centre and network services. 
Proof of Work / 
Proof of Stake 
Types of Blockchain consensus algorithms which 
are processes in computer science used to achieve 
agreement on a single data value among distributed 
systems [CoinBundle Team 2018]. 
Rebound effect The way in which micro-actions can be nullified by counter 
balancing adjustments elsewhere in the global system. 
Often used to refer to the way increased energy efficiency 
leads to more energy usage overall. 
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Renewable energy Energy that is produced using the sun, wind, etc., or from 
crops, rather than using fuels such as oil or coal. 
Router A piece of electronic equipment that connects computer 
networks to each other, and sends information between 
networks. 
Scope 1 emissions Direct emissions from burning of fossil fuels on site 
(includes company facilities and vehicles) 
Scope 2 emissions Indirect emissions from purchased electricity and gas. 
Scope 3 emissions All other indirect emissions in a company’s value 
chain; including upstream emissions in the supply chain 
(e.g. emissions from purchased goods and services, 
transportation of these goods to the company, use of 
leased assets such as offices or data centres, business 
travel and employee commuting) and downstream 
emissions (from transportation, distribution, use and end of 
life treatment of sold products, investments and leased 
assets). Scope 3 emissions form the majority of a 
company’s emissions. 
Semiconductor A material, such as silicon, that allows electricity to move 
through it more easily when its temperature increases, or 
an electronic device made from this material. 
Server A central computer from which other computers get 
information. 
Set top box An electronic device that makes it possible to watch digital 
broadcasts on ordinary televisions. 
Smart technology [e.g. 
smart grids/cities/ 
logistics/agriculture] 
An object/city/process etc. that is internet-connected and 
therefore able to make intelligent decisions. 
Supply chain emissions Emissions that occur upstream of a company’s own 
operations, including emissions from purchased goods and 
services, transportation of these goods to the company, use 
of leased assets such as offices or data centres, business 
travel and employee commuting. See upstream scope 3 
emissions. 
Truncation error In the context of carbon accounting, truncation error 
describes the omission of some proportion of the total 
carbon footprint by LCAs because this approach is unable 
to track all the supply chain pathways associated with a 
thing. That means, they disregard or truncate the pathways 
that individually only contribute a small share of the total, 
often set to less than 1%, even though these can make up 
sizeable share of the total if they are all added up. See 
Appendix F for more detail. 




Emissions associated with the use of a product, mainly 
from energy use and maintenance. 
Value chain emissions Emissions occurring in a company’s value chain, both 
upstream in the supply chain (from manufacture and 
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transport), from its operations and downstream 
(from product use by customers). 
Video-on-demand 
services 
Services (e.g. Netflix, Amazon Prime, BBC iPlayer) that 
provide a system for watching films or recorded 
programmes on the internet or television at any time. 
Virtual reality A set of images and sounds, produced by a computer, that 
seem to represent a place or a situation that a person can 
take part in. 
Virtualisation/ Server 
virtualisation 
The process of changing something that exists in a real 




Table A.2 Abbreviations used throughout the report. 
Abbreviation Term 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
A&E Andrae and Edler (2015) 
BEIS Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
B&E Bekhir and Elmeligi (2018) 
CEH UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology 
CRT Cathode Ray Tube 
DAC Direct Air Capture 
EC European Commission 
EEIO Environmentally Extended Input Output 
GeSI Global e-Sustainability Initiative 
GHG Greenhouse gas emissions 
GSMA Global System for Mobile Communications Association 
ICT Information and Communication Technology 
IoT Internet of Things 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
LCA Life Cycle Analysis 
LED Light-Emitting Diode 
M&L  Malmodin and Lundén (2018) 
PC Personal Computer 
PPA Power Purchasing Agreements 
REGO Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin 
SBTi Science Based Targets initiative 
SWC Small World Consulting 
TV Television 








Emissions are measured in kilograms (kg), tons (t), kilotons (kt), megatons (Mt) and 
gigatons (Gt). GHG emissions, for example, are often expressed in MtCO2e or 
GtCO2e. 
 
1 Gt = 1,000 Mt; 1 Mt = 1,000 kt; 1 kt = 1,000 t; 1 t = 1,000 kg 
 
Energy consumption is measured in watt-hour (Wh), kilowatt-hour (kWh), megawatt -
hour (MWh), gigawatt -hour (GWh) and terawatt -hour (TWh). 
 
1 TWh = 1,000 GWh; 1 GWh = 1,000 MWh; 1 MWh = 1,000 kWh; 1 kWh = 1,000 Wh 
 
A.4 Scope 
For the purposes of this report, we have adopted a broad definition of ICT to include 
all types of data centres, networks and user devices used for processing, storing, 
sending and receiving digital information. This includes data centres of all scales (i.e. 
servers run by companies in cupboard up to large data centres), all major types of 
networks (telephony, mobile and broadband data, TV), and a wide range of digital end 
user devices, such as PCs, laptops, tablets, mobile and fixed phones, TVs, displays 
and gaming equipment (see Appendix B.2.1). We included all stages of equipment 
lifecycle, from the extraction of the raw materials, manufacture, transport and use to 
end of life. For networks and data centres, we included infrastructure (such as the 
construction and running of the building housing the servers, including cooling, and 
the digging down of network cable tracks) and operator activities (e.g. business travel, 
office heating and lighting etc.). 
 
A.5 Method 
For the literature review, we built on our collective knowledge of the literature and 
carried out additional literature searches using Google Scholar, the ACM Digital 
Library and the citation information from relevant papers. Note that this was not a 
systematic literature review. For the main review of ICT’s carbon impact (Section 2), 
we included peer-reviewed journal articles published from 2015 onwards with the key 
words outlined below. These key words were also drawn upon to facilitate our analysis 
of the trends in ICT and their environmental implications (Section 3). For our policy 
analysis (Section 4.1), we focused solely on European Commission documents and 
websites. Our analysis of industry pledges (Section 4.2) draw on a survey of annual 
reports, blog posts and web pages for 18 major ICT companies (Microsoft, Sky, 
Vodafone, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Facebook, Tesla, Google, Samsung, Ericsson, 
Spotify, Huawei, Cisco, Sony, Nintendo, Intel and IBM). 
 
A.5.1 Key words 
• Sustainability 
• Energy consumption/ energy 
• Carbon emissions 
• GHG (Greenhouse gas) emissions 
• LCA (Life-Cycle Analysis) 
• Efficiency 
• ICT/ IT (information technology)/ digital technologies 
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• User devices 
• Internet traffic/ Internet 
• Data traffic 
• Data centres/ data centers 
• Communication networks/ networks 
• Big data 
• AI (Artificial Intelligence) 
• Machine learning 
• Data science 
• IoT (Internet of Things) 




• Video streaming/ video 
• YouTube 
• Video-on-demand 
• TV/ television 
• Cloud computing/ services 
• Jevons Paradox 
• Rebound effect 
A.5.2 Selection of key papers 
Articles were selected guided by the following questions: 
• Does the paper focus on the energy or carbon impacts of ICT, its major 
components (e.g. data centres, networks), or its major application areas (e.g. 
AI, IoT)? 
• Does the paper focus on the impact ICT has on energy or carbon consumption 
in other sectors?  
A.5.3 Consultation with key experts 
In addition to this, we consulted with the following leading experts based on their 
extensive knowledge on the carbon impacts of ICT through video conference calls: 
• Dr. Lotfi Belkhir (Associate Professor at W Booth School of Engineering 
Practice and Technology, McMaster University) 
• Dr. Anders Andrae (Senior Expert at Huawei Technologies) 
• Jens Malmodin (Senior Specialist at Ericsson) 
• Dr. Peter Garraghan (Associate Professor at the School of Computing and 
Communications, Lancaster University) 
• Livia Cabernard (PhD student at the Institute of Science, Technology and 
Policy, ETH Zurich) 
• Prof. Chris Preist (Professor of Sustainability and Computer Systems at 
University of Bristol) 
We discussed their research in relation to ICT’s carbon footprint, their opinion of other 
prominent studies, their response to criticism from the other experts, their view on the 
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future of ICT’s emissions and on the trends posing risks and opportunities for ICT’s 
impact on climate change. 
 
A.5.4 Other sources of information 
For this report, we drew on research by Small World Consulting (SWC) Ltd. into sector 
emissions to adjust estimates by the key studies in Section 2 for truncation error.  
 
SWC developed an environmentally extended input output (EEIO) model (described 
in detail by Berners-Lee et al. [2011] and Kennelly et al. [2019]) that uses data from 
the Office of National Statistics on the expenses and GHG emissions from 105 
industries in the UK to calculate the carbon intensity per Pound spent. This allows us 
to model carbon flows in the UK economy and the upstream scope 3 emissions of an 
industry in its supply chain, by tracking the economic activity stimulated by each sector 
in other sectors. In contrast to LCAs, SWC’s EEIO model tracks 100% of all supply 
chains associated with a sector. It can be used to estimate the truncation error of LCAs 
for a particular sector; that is, the percentage of the total emissions that is typically 
omitted by an LCA. We note that SWC’s EEIO model is based on UK emissions data 
which are not representative of other economies, yet it provides a good–enough 
estimate to help understand the potential truncation error incurred by LCA estimates 
(Appendix F). 
 
For manufacture of ICT equipment, these omissions include radiative forcing, 
manufacture of buildings and machines, of mining equipment and of transport vehicles 
and other operator activities and overheads associated with the manufacture of a 
product. We also know that most LCAs do not include pathways that contribute less 
than 1% of the total carbon footprint. In total, these excluded pathways make up 40% 
of the total embodied carbon.  
 
For the operation of ICT equipment, electricity is the most important source of GHG 
emissions. Based on a hybridised EEIO-LCA model SWC developed from scope 1 
and 2 emissions data from BEIS [Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy 2019] and the IEA [2019b], SWC estimates that the carbon intensity of global 
average grid electricity in 2018 was 0.63 kgCO2e/kWh or MtCO2e/TWh. The carbon 
intensity factor for electricity used in most LCAs includes emissions from electricity 
generation and transmission and distribution losses, but not extraction and 
transportation of fuel to the plant, the manufacture of equipment used in these 
processes and operator activities. Based on this, we estimate that LCAs omit 18% of 
the use phase carbon. Our truncation error mark-up applied to the key studies 
reviewed here is based on the difference between the specific electricity intensity 
factor they report and SWC’s factor of 0.63 kgCO2e/kWh. 
 
All percentages out of global GHG emissions are based on a total of 57.9 GtCO2e in 
2020. This is based on 55.6 GtCO2e GHG emissions, including land use change, in 
2018 [Olivier and Peters 2019], assuming the growth rate of 2% in 2018 applies to 




This report is not based on a systematic literature review but rather built on our own 
knowledge of the sector alongside strategic literature searches aimed at covering the 
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main studies in the field. We have focused on critically analysing the main arguments 
surrounding the ICT sector’s environmental footprint and trends. We have not 
scrutinised reports about the impact of individual components of ICT (e.g. the carbon 
impacts of servers alone) or covered the full breadth of research papers within ICT on 
IoT, Blockchain and AI that do not take an environmental position (e.g. instead focus 
solely on health, finance, etc.). We have limited our discussion of impacts on the wider 
economy to the ICT sector’s potential to enable efficiencies or drive emissions in other 
sectors; a full, economy-wide assessment of ICT’s environmental impacts globally was 
deemed out of scope for this study. We are confident, however, that we have captured 
the main academic debates and the most relevant non-academic publications on the 
climate change impact of the ICT sector as a whole and the impacts of prominent ICT 
trends going forward. We call for future work to fully assess the Enablement and 
Global Rebounds narratives (see Figure 2.5) on the world’s economy. 
 
Carbon accounting is a rather imprecise science due to the complexity of the supply 
chain emissions pathways and issues with how to allocate emissions to a particular 
product, activity or sector. For each carbon footprint calculation, there is a margin of 
error. The uncertainty increases even further for projections of future emissions, as 
these are influenced by the actions of companies, policy makers, individual users and 
unforeseen events like natural catastrophe and pandemics. There are several 
unknowns including what changes future innovations might bring or the carbon 
footprint of activities which are largely undocumented (e.g. the dark web). The carbon 
footprint of some of the emerging ICT trends are also difficult to calculate, e.g. IoT and 
Blockchain due to their hidden and distributed nature.  
 
We have tried to make this uncertainty clear throughout the report. The carbon 
footprints calculations in this report serve as approximations indicating the order of 
magnitude and important trends in emissions that can guide decision-making about 
the effects that different courses of action could have on climate change. Furthermore, 
the lack of coherent standards for carbon accounting leads to different approaches, 
scopes and assumptions being used by different studies. We have attempted to make 
these explicit and compare the different methodologies used by the key studies 
reviewed in Section 2.2. 
 
For reasons outlined above, emission estimates are more uncertain than estimates of 
electricity consumption. Nevertheless, an assessment of ICT’s climate change impact 
needs to focus on GHG emissions rather than electricity consumption alone because 
it is emissions that ultimately drive climate change, and electricity consumption itself 
does not capture the impact of factors such as energy source mix and emissions in 
the energy generation supply chain. Since most studies focus on ICT’s energy 
consumption, we felt that we could most usefully contribute to the scientific debate by 
applying our expertise in supply chain emission accounting to clarify some of the 
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B Estimates of ICT Emissions 
B.1 Historical Estimates of ICT’s GHG footprint 
 
Table B.1 Historical estimates of ICT’s GHG footprint. Unless otherwise stated, all estimates include embodied 
 (based on LCAs) and use phase GHG emissions. 
*Based on 670 TWh in 2007 and 930 TWh in 2012 [Lannoo et al. 2013] and 0.68 MtCO2e/TWh (SWC estimate). 
**Based on 655 TWh in 2007 and 909 TWh in 2012 [Van Heddeghem et al. 2014] and 0.68 MtCO2e/TWh (SWC 
estimate). 
Study Year MtCO2e Scope for emissions 
Gartner [2007] 2007 620 CO2 emissions only; use phase and emissions 
for phones, PCs, printers, data centres and 
networks 
GeSI [2008] 2002 530 Desktop PCs and laptops and PC peripherals 
(monitors, printers), data centres, telecoms 





2007 1,150 Phones, PCs, modems, networks and data 
centres (630 MtCO2e); TVs, TV peripherals and 
TV networks (390 MtCO2e); other E&M 
equipment, including audio devices, cameras 
and gaming consoles (130 MtCO2e) 
GeSI [2012] 2011 910 PCs (desktops, laptops), mobile devices 
(tablets, smartphones, regular mobile phones), 
and peripherals (external monitors, printers, 
set-top boxes, routers, IPTV boxes); fixed and 
wireless networks (excluding local WiFi 
networks), data centres (servers, storage and 
cooling) 
2020 1270 
Lannoo et al. 
[2013]* 
2007 454 Emissions from electricity and use phase only; 
computers, data centres, networks 2012 630 
Malmodin et 
al. [2013] 
2020 2,200 Phones (fixed, mobile), PCs (desktops, 
laptops), modems, networks and data centres 
(1,100 MtCO2e); TVs, TV networks and TV 
peripherals (1,100 MtCO2e); other E&M 
equipment, including audio devices, cameras 




2007 444 Emissions are use phase electricity only; 





2010 720 Phones (fixed, smartphones, other mobile), 
tablets, PCs (desktops, laptops), displays, 
modems, some IoT, networks and data centres 
 
 
B.2 Detailed Review of the Key Studies 
This report focuses on reviewing peer-reviewed studies by three main research groups 
published from 2015 that estimate ICT’s carbon footprint from 2015 onward. Here, we 
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include a summary of the studies scope and assumptions (B.2.1), then follow with an 
overview of estimates (B.2.2) and a detailed review of relevant studies by researchers 
around Andrae (B.2.3), Belkhir (B.2.4) and Malmodin (B.2.5). 
 
B.2.1 Overview of scope and methodological differences 
Studies on the energy and carbon footprint of IT can be classed as either bottom-up 
(based on LCAs, energy use reports for certain devices and company reports, 
combined with data on the number of devices produced and used in a given year and 
the number of network subscriptions), or top-down (based on national or global 
statistics and input-output analysis). The latter is often difficult to obtain. Most studies 
use a bottom-up approach in combination with some top-down data, for example 
combining LCAs for user devices with global statistics for data traffic, such as from 
Cisco. Using a combined method is probably the best approach to assess emissions 
accurately. 
 
The studies reviewed for this study use different methodological approaches. Some 
only include emissions from electricity (e.g. A&E), presenting a more limited picture, 
while others also include other sources of GHGs (e.g. B&E; Malmodin’s research), 
such as fossil fuel backup power for data centres, fuels used by vehicles and other 
sources of emissions in the process of mining. 
 
All the key studies include use phase emissions but studies vary as to the other 
lifecycle stages considered. On one end of the spectrum, in addition to the use phase, 
A&E only include production energy, just one aspect of embodied emissions. On the 
other end, Malmodin’s research includes end of life emissions, that is, the emissions 
associated with waste management. The stages of the equipment lifecycle covered 
by the different studies in this review as well as the scope and assumptions applied 
are summarised in Table B.2. 
 
Table B.2 Scope matrix for studies included in this review. T&D = Transmission and distribution losses in electricity 
grids. Note that Malmodin includes some 'Other digital technologies or trends’, specifically: wearables such as 
smart watches and fitness trackers, smart energy meters, control units, surveillance cameras, public displays, 
payment terminals and the internet-connected communication device in vending machines. 
*Included in the E&M sector estimates, not ICT estimates. 











Smartphones ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Nonsmart mobile phones ✓ ✕ ✓ 
Fixed phones ✕ ✕ ✓ 
Tablets ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Phablets ✓ ✓ ✕ 
Laptops/Notebooks ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Desktop PCs ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Displays ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Computer peripherals (e.g. 
mouse and keyboard) 
✕ ✕ ✓ 
Projectors ✕ ✕ ✓* 
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Cameras ✕ ✕ ✓* 
Home media players/audio 
systems/traditional speakers 
✓ ✕ ✓* 
Portable media players, e.g. 
iPods 
✕ ✕ ✓* 
Smart speakers ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Smart watches/fitness 
trackers 
✕ ✕ ✓* 
Headphones/Earphones ✕ ✕ ✓* 
Game consoles ✓ ✕ ✓* 




✓ ✓ ✓ 
     
Networks    
Fixed telephony ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Mobile ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fixed access wired ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Fixed access WiFi ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Enterprise networks ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Lower power, lower 
bandwidth device networks 
for IoT 
✕ ✕ ✕ 
       
Data centres 
Servers ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Buildings that house servers ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Cooling ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Backup power supplies ✕ ✓ ✓ 
Operator activities, such as 
offices, business travel, 
maintenance of equipment 
✕ ✕ ✓ 
        
TVs, TV peripherals and TV networks 
TVs ✓ ✕ Yes* 
Set top boxes ✓ ✕ Yes* 
Aerials ✕ ✕ - 
Satellite dishes ✕ ✕ Yes* 
DVD/BD players ✓ ✕ Yes* 
TV networks ✕ ✕ Yes* 
>>Cable ✕ ✕ Yes* 
>>Satellite ✕ ✕ Yes* 
>>DTT ✕ ✕ Yes* 
       
Other digital technologies or trends  
Cryptocurrencies/Blockchain ✕ ✕ ✕ 
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AI/Machine Learning ✕ ✕ ✓ 
IoT ✕ ✕ ✓ (some) 
Satellites ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Radio (device+networks) ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Embedded devices, e.g. 
sensors for smart cities, 
smart home tech, M2M 
communication 
✕ ✕ ✓ (some) 
Private internet, e.g. for 
military purposes 
✕ ✕ ✕ 
        
Trends considered for future projections  
Blockchain ✕ ✕ ✕ 
Artificial Intelligence/Deep 
learning/Machine Learning 
✓ ✕ ✕ 
IoT ✓ ✕ ✓ 
Video ✓ ✕ ✕ 
       
Assumptions 









Aspects of electricity likely 










Use phase included Yes Yes Yes 
Embodied included (based 
on LCAs) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Embodied carbon included Production 
electricity only; 
no transport or 
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B.2.2 Estimates for ICT’s GHG Emissions in 2015 and 2020 
Table B.3 below estimates summaries by the key studies for 2015 and 2020. 
 
Table B.3 Estimates of GHG emissions from the ICT sector in a) 2015 and b) 2020. 
GHG 
emissions 











M&L 2015 395 160 180 733 420 1,153 
B&E 2015 
minimum 
290 281 204 775 - N/A 
B&E 2015 
maximum 




388 281 204 873 - N/A 
A&E 2015 best 
case 
186 213 190 589 329 917 
A&E 2015 
expected case 
324 441 287 1,052 463 1,515 
A&E 2015 worst 
case 
514 582 454 1,550 706 2,257 
GHG 
emissions 











Malmodin 2020 392 127 168 690 400 1,090 
B&E 2020 
minimum 
343 495 269 1,107 - N/A 
B&E 2020 
maximum 
542 495 269 1,306 - N/A 
B&E 2020 
average 
443 495 269 1,206 - N/A 
A&E 2020 Best 
case 
201 216 206 623 264 887 
A&E 2020 
Expected case 
369 448 631 1,448 413 1,860 
A&E 2020 Worst 
case 
790 1,001 1,251 3,042 711 3,634 
 
 
The studies vary in the scope with B&E only including user devices, data centres and 
networks, A&E including TVs and M&L including other consumer electronics such as 
cameras and audio systems in a car and portable GPS. In order to make estimates 
more comparable, we have brought them to the same ‘system boundary’, by adding 
Malmodin’s estimate for the E&M sector (400 MtCO2e; excluding print media) to B&E’s 
and A&E’s estimates (after subtracting emissions from TV from A&E’s total estimates, 
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using information provided in their supplementary information). The results are shown 
below. Considering that Andrae judges his Best case to be most realistic for 2020 
[personal communication], the most likely range is 1.0-1.7 GtCO2e for ICT, TVs and 
other consumer electronics in 2020; this is 1.8-2.9% of global GHG emissions. 
 
Table B.4 Estimates of GHG emissions from the ICT sector in 2020 after adjusting for scope to include TVs and 
other consumer electronics. 
 MtCO2e Share of total GHG 
emissions 
Malmodin 2020 1,090 1.9% 
B&E 2020 Minimum 1,507 2.6% 
B&E 2020 Maximum 1,706 2.9% 
A&E 2020 Best case 1,023 1.8% 
A&E 2020 Expected case 1,848 3.2% 
A&E 2020 Worst case 3,442 5.9% 
 
 
B.2.3 Research by Andrae and colleagues 
Approach 
Andrae and Edler [2015], from here on A&E, used a hybrid top-down bottom-up 
approach to model the production and use phase electricity use of user devices, 
networks, data centres and TVs between 2010 and 2030. User device emissions are 
modelled bottom-up from predicted production numbers and estimates for production 
and use phase energy use derived from LCAs. Estimates for the use phase electricity 
consumption of data centre and network are based on top-down data traffic trends 
based on Cisco data and estimates for electricity per data unit from the literature, while 
estimates for production electricity use are based on a fixed share of total electricity 
use by networks and data centres (5%, 10% and 15% for best, expected and worst 
case, respectively) – a method that seems somewhat imprecise. Their model also 
considers changes in energy efficiency (1% annually in the worst case, 3% in the 
expected case and 5% in the best case) and in electricity carbon intensity based on 
projected share of renewables which vary by year and scenario. 
 
Findings 
A&E’s estimates for 2030 vary by a factor of 13, yet all scenarios show an increase 
relative to 2020 (see Figure B.1 Andrae and Edler’s projections for GHG emissions 
from ICT by year.). While a growth trend in data traffic underlies the increase in total 
emissions, the large uncertainty in the size of this trend leads to the wide range of 
estimates. While the footprint of user devices is becoming less important, partly due 
to a shift from desktops and laptops to smaller devices like smartphones, and networks 
and data centres will contribute an increasing share of the total emissions over the 
next decade, due to the increase in data traffic. A&E argue that this growth in data 
traffic is driven by the popularity of video streaming, especially over mobile data, and 
emerging new data-heavy technologies, such as cloud computing. In more recent 
papers [2019a, 2019b, 2019c], Andrae also argues that AI and deep learning, IoT, 
Blockchain, virtual and augmented reality, facial recognition, and the rollout of 5G 
could lead to an explosion of data traffic over the next decade. In addition, IoT devices 
could increase the production footprint of ICT. 
 
 





Figure B.1 Andrae and Edler’s projections for GHG emissions from ICT by year. 
 
A&E’s worst case paints a dark picture and has been criticised as unrealistic by B&E 
and Malmodin [personal communication]. In personal communication, Andrae noted 
that A&E’s study overestimated the carbon footprint of fixed wired and WiFi networks 
quite much even in the best case but underestimated mobile networks. Thus, for 
wireless and fixed access, the best case is the most relevant while for mobile, the 
expected case is the most likely. In 2019c, Andrae also notes that he overestimated 
production electricity of networks and data centres and that the ratio of production 
electricity to use phase electricity should be 2% instead of 5% used for the best case. 
Andrae’s revised estimates for 2020 and 2030 (see Table B.5) are close to the best 
case scenario, partly thanks to increasing awareness of ICT’s large energy footprint. 
But while ICT is saving electricity, those savings are used for further expansion, such 
as in cloud computing. If the trends discussed above take off unexpectedly, Andrae 
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Table B.5 Andrae’s revised estimates for 2020 and 2030 [personal communication], based on Andrae [2019b, 
2019c, 2020]. Andrae uses an electricity carbon intensity of 0.55 MtCO2e/TWh in 2020 and 0.54 MtCO2e/TWh in 
2030. Consumer devices including WiFi modems and TVs. *Use phase only 
Year 2020 2030 


















330-550  440  400-
1000  
216-540  378  
Networks* 200-
270  
110-149  129  330-
870  
178-470  324  
Data centres* 290-
300  
160-165  162  600-
1000  
324-540  432  




138-209  173  180-
300  








810-1728  1269  
 
In summary, Andrae believes that ICT’s carbon footprint will continue to grow if not for 
major breakthroughs, albeit at a lower rate for the next few years than previously 
estimated. While the absolute total will increase, ICT’s share of global electricity might 
stay stable if there are interventions or breakthroughs but this is unlikely under 
business as usual. Emissions might only reduce if data centres and production 
facilities are run entirely on renewable energy and if data intensity grows slower than 
expected [Andrae 2020]. Andrae [2020] notes that there are several potential 
‘engineering tricks’ that might uphold efficiency gains even though Moore’s Law has 
ended, such as decreasing semiconductor use stage power and nanophotonics, but it 
is unclear to what extent they have already been exploited. 
 
Limitations and Criticism 
One important difference to the other studies reviewed here is that only production 
electricity is included but not transport and material extraction, nor other sources of 
GHG other than electricity. Using the example of smartphones, they estimate between 
18.8 (best case) and 37.5 (worst case) kgCO2e in 2010 but with efficiency gains, this 
decreases to 14.1-35.0 kgCO2e in 2015 and 10.6-33.0 kgCO2e in 2020. The 
assumption of decreasing embodied emissions for devices is problematic because 
smartphones are getting bigger and computationally more powerful, counteracting 
efficiency gains and greening of the electricity grid. In comparison, M&L estimated 45 
kgCO2e for the average smartphone embodied footprint and B&E estimated 24.5-
45.3kg. Thus, the study likely underestimates the embodied carbon footprint of ICT. 
 
A&E’s study has also been criticised by B&E for using a variety of device lifetimes in 
their scenarios that are not based on the published literature (e.g. 1, 2 and 3 years for 
smartphones, nonsmartphones, phablets and tablets for worst, expected and best 
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In their calculations, A&E use the same number of device units for both the production 
and operational energy. In a sense, they are calculating how much electricity was used 
to produce all devices in use in a given year, regardless of when these devices were 
produced. That assumption is flawed as the same energy efficiency assumptions are 
applied to all devices used in a given year, even though older devices produced in 
earlier years will have not benefitted from these efficiency gains. Their figures might 
therefore underestimate the production energy for user devices further. 
 
However, this paper has to be credited as the most transparent of all the papers 
reviewed, as the authors lay out clearly their assumptions and calculations in the 
supplementary information, broken down to the individual device and network type for 
every year between 2010 and 2030. It is also well-grounded in the previous published 
literature. The biggest criticism is probably the wide range of projections which leads 
to a difference between the best and worst case by a factor of 13.4; that said, a high 
degree of uncertainty does exist especially in such a rapidly developing sector as ICT. 
 
B.2.4 Research by Belkhir and colleagues 
Approach 
Belkhir and Elmeligi (2018), from here on B&E, used a bottom-up approach for user 
devices and a top-down approach for data centres and networks and for total 
projections beyond 2020. The footprint of user devices is calculated by multiplying the 
number of phones sold in a given year by the lifecycle annual emissions, including 
embodied carbon spread over the expected lifetime and annual electricity 
consumption. One of the strengths of this study lies in the systematic review of useful 
life estimates in the literature for user devices which is more rigorous and provides a 
smaller range of estimates for user device embodied footprints than A&E more 
arbitrary useful life estimates. Data centres estimates are based on data from 2008 by 
Vereecken et al. [2009] and network estimates are based on 2008-2012 data from Van 
Heddeghem et al. [2014] which B&E projected to grow linearly. 
 
B&E provide a breakdown of emissions for user devices, data centres and networks 
for each year 2007-2020, but model only the total carbon footprint of ICT from 2020 to 
2040 by fitting a linear and an exponential growth curve to their estimates of total 
emissions from 2007 to 2020. 
 
Findings 
B&E estimate ICT’s footprint in 2020 at between 1.11 GtCO2e (minimum) and 1.31 
GtCO2e (maximum). The range is considerably smaller than in A&E and is due to 
uncertainties in the carbon footprint of user devices, mainly desktops and displays. 
Data centre and network estimates are the same for both minimum and maximum 
estimates. The authors suggest that including TVs could add another 435 TWh for 
operational energy use alone (assuming a global electricity carbon intensity of 0.6 
MtCO2e/TWh, this would add 261 MtCO2e), assuming a 2% growth per year in number 
of TVs. 
 
With regards to projections beyond 2020, both the linear and exponential curve show 
an increase (see Figure 2.4 in Section 2.1.2). The authors note that exponential 
growth, which would lead to between 2.48 and 2.62 GtCO2e in 2030 and 5.1 and 5.3 
GtCO2e in 2040, is the most realistic, and that growth is highly likely if business as 
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usual continues. These predictions necessarily assume that trends active over the last 
decade continue for the next two decades and they assume unchecked growth. With 
an explosion of data traffic driven by trends like AI, Blockchain and IoT and the slowing 
down of efficiency improvements, there could be an additional jump in ICT’s emissions 
within the next 3-5 years and an overall higher growth in emissions than modelled in 
their projections. However, while data centres will likely increase in power 
consumption, they might decrease in GHG emissions, if the trend of powering them 
with renewable energy continues [Belkhir in personal communication]. 
 
The predictions beyond 2020 are limited to totals and are not broken down by 
component but in their paper, the authors discuss the trend of wireless and mobile 
communications, cloud-based computing and IoT driving increases in data centres 
and networks. One of B&E main findings is the disproportionate impact of 
smartphones, whose footprint they estimate at 125 MtCO2e in 2020.30 Most of this is 
due to their embodied footprint which is a concern in combination with their short 
average lifetime of 2 years. As many online data-heavy activities such as social media 
and video streaming are accessed by consumers on their mobile phones, the 
emissions associated with the data centres behind platforms like Facebook can be 
seen as a knock-on effect of mobile phone usage [Belkhir in personal communication]. 
 
Limitations and Criticism 
B&E included the production and operational energy of ICT for user devices but they 
only considered the operational energy of data centres and networks, ignoring their 
embodied carbon because they found it to be negligibly small and excluding operator 
activities, potentially leading to a slight underestimate of total emissions. 
 
B&E do not consider efficiency improvements in their estimates. For user device 
footprints this assumption might hold approximately as devices are ‘upgraded’ with 
more functionalities and a correspondingly higher footprint. However, for data centres, 
their estimates are based on extrapolation from 2008 emissions from data centres with 
a power usage effectiveness of 2, much higher than most modern data centres, 
without adjusting for efficiency improvements. This might explain why B&E’s data 
centre estimate of 495 MtCO2e in 2020 is at the higher end relative to the other studies 
discussed here. Belkhir himself noted that their projection for data centres in 2020 is 
overestimated as efficiency improvements have unexpectedly been able to keep up 
with growing demand, even though this counterbalancing effect will soon come to an 
end as efficiency improvements slow down according to Belkhir. 
 
While transparent about their sources, all peer-reviewed articles and publicly 
accessible industry reports, they did not make available supplementary data with the 
raw data for the total carbon footprint of ICT (with the exception of figures for 2020, 
2030 and 2040) and user devices by year or their calculations. However, in personal 
communication with the lead author, we were able to get access to the raw data. 
 
30 This is based on 3.6 billion smartphones, including phablets, in 2020. Note that B&E did not include 
traditional mobile phones or fixed phones in the study’s scope. B&E estimate 5.6 billion mobile phones 
to be in operation in 2030 and 8.7 billion in 2040, although data from Cisco [2020] suggests that the 
number of mobile phones could rise to 8.3 billion in 2023 already so there might actually be an even 








B.2.5 Research by Malmodin and colleagues 
Approach 
Malmodin and Lundén [2018], hereafter M&L, use a hybrid top-down/bottom-up 
approach and draw on primary industry data from major manufacturers, sales statistics 
and LCAs for equipment. Emissions of user devices were modelled: 1) bottom-up 
based on the number of shipped and in-use devices in 2015 and the embodied and 
use phase emissions per unit estimated in LCAs, and 2) top-down the energy and 
carbon footprints of 35 major ICT and E&E manufacturers (reported in the 
supplementary materials) which were extrapolated based on those companies’ share 
of revenue. Embodied footprints of user devices are the most uncertain part of their 
study.  
 
Network footprints are based on a top-down analysis of network electricity 
consumption published by the authors [Malmodin and Lundén 2018b] which draw on 
anonymised operator data covering 70% of subscriptions, which was extrapolated to 
the global level. Data centre emissions are based on a mix of public and anonymised 
operator data. The authors note that it was not easy to get hold of primary data from 
networks and data centres operators because it is considered competitive. The 
operator data are therefore anonymised; however, they report data collected from 
public reports in the supplementary materials. 
 
M&L only estimated ICT’s global emissions for 2015 but in personal communication, 
Malmodin has shared his more recent and yet unpublished estimates for 2018 and 
2020 with us (see Table B.6 and Table B.7) which follow the same approach as M&L 
but are based on more recent operator data. We are also drawing on a presentation 
given by Malmodin at Energimyndigheten in 2019 [Malmodin 2019]. 
 
Table B.6 Breakdown of ICT’s carbon footprint as provided by Malmodin [personal communication]. 
MtCO2e 2015 2018 2020 
ICT without TV 730 705 690 
Networks 182 173 168 
Data centres 141 129 127 
Enterprise 
networks 
17 16 15.5 
User devices 392 380 375 




420 N/A 400 
ICT with TV 1,153 N/A 1,087 
 
Table B.7 Operational electricity consumption by the ICT industry as provided by Malmodin [personal 
communication]. The total is adjusted for double counting. 
Operational TWh 2015 2018 2020 
ICT Total 803 836 859 
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Networks 222 243 257 
Data centres 220 225 230 
Enterprise 
networks 
25 25 25 




Malmodin and colleagues argue that ICT’s global emissions have broadly stabilised; 
they increased slightly from 720 MtCO2e in 2010 to only 733 MtCO2e in 2015 and 
decreased to 690 MtCO2e in 2020 (this includes user devices, networks and data 
centres). Relative to 2015, emissions from data centres have decreased the most (by 
10%) followed by enterprise networks (9%) and networks (8%), even though electricity 
consumption increased in that time period due to the continued build out of 4G and 
5G networks and an increasing number of data centre servers. The reason why the 
increased total energy use by ICT does not translate into higher carbon footprints is 
that it is partly offset by a higher share of renewable energy, a slight decrease in 
network overheads and that embodied carbon has stayed largely the same. The E&M 
sector (specifically, TVs, TV networks and other consumer electronics) add another 
420 MtCO2e in 2015 [M&L] and 400 MtCO2e in 2020 (see Table B.3), showing a slight 
decrease too. 
 
M&L further argue that ICT and E&M sector growth is starting to decouple from GHG 
emissions as ICT use is continuing to grow in terms of number of users and data traffic, 
albeit slower than previously as the world is moving towards saturation.31 M&L argue 
that electricity consumption in data centre and networks does not follow the same 
exponential growth curve because of efficiency gains by servers. They show that the 
carbon footprint per subscription and per GB of data in networks has decreased fast 
since the 1990s and argue that while the number of networks users has increased by 
a factor of 10 and data traffic has increased 10,000 times between 1995 and 2015 if 
voice traffic is included, yet ICT’s carbon footprint has only tripled during that time. 
They hold that ICT’s footprint does increase with use but is better correlated with the 
number of users rather than data traffic. M&L acknowledge that Moore’s Law has 
slowed down since 2012/13 but note that there usually a time lag until the effects are 
felt outside of research labs. In personal communication, Malmodin also noted that so 
far, efficiency improvements are continuing. The decoupling is also helped by 
enablement of emission savings in other industries, for example from print media as 
newspapers increasingly shift online, even though they admit that the effect still has 
to be seen in other sectors like transport. 
 
These predictions stand in contrast to an earlier study [Malmodin et al. 2013] that 
projected ICT’s footprint at 1.1 GtCO2e in 2020 plus an additional 1.3 GtCO2e for the 
E&M sector, including 680 MtCO2e for TVs and TV peripherals. This study argued that 
the increase in emissions would be driven mainly by an increase in the number of 
devices and therefore network subscriptions and data traffic, which will have been 
partly counterbalanced by energy efficiency improvements in networks, more efficient 
 
31 Malmodin [2019] argues that data traffic grew 70 times 1995-2000, 15 times 2000-05, 4 times 2010-
15, 3 times 2015-20. 
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TVs, a shift from desktops to laptops and lower standby electricity consumption. 
 
Explaining the discrepancy with earlier predictions, M&L argue that their earlier study 
was still based on older data which assumed the historical growth of PC and TV sales 
would continue, whereas more recent research takes into account the peak of PCs 
around 2011 and a slow decline of TV and tablet sales as well as better power 
management. The only PC type that is expected to increase is gaming PCs which 
have a higher carbon footprint. Consumer electronics sales (e.g. cameras, media 
players) are also declining thanks a move to smaller devices like laptops, tablets and 
smartphones and in particular the integration of functions into smartphones which 
replace older and less efficient user devices. There is also a shift from traditional 
storage devices (e.g. memory sticks) to cloud storage.  
 
At the same time, they argue that M2M communication and IoT are only adding a very 
small footprint. In contrast to earlier studies by Malmodin [e.g. Malmodin et al. 2010, 
2013], M&L’s study included several IoT devices, including wearables, smart energy 
meters control units, surveillance cameras, public displays, payment terminals and the 
internet-connected communication device in vending machines. For 2015, they 
concluded that their impact on emissions was marginal. However, they did not include 
other now-common IoTs like smart speakers or any connected devices from other 
sectors, such as those embedded in vehicles, buildings or IoT used for military, 
medical, security and industrial purposes, other than those listed above, although they 
note that these are expected to add to GHG emissions in the future. The authors note 
that the number of IoT devices might explode and that M2M communication and 
therefore the number of network subscriptions are likely to increase rapidly in the 
future too. Already between 2010 and 2015, the number of M2M IoT subscriptions 
increased from 70 million in 2010 to 350 million in 2015. 
 
A report by Ericsson [2019] presents a 2020 scenario which assumed a large increase 
in IoT and other new devices, with 500 billion sensors and tags, one billion connectivity 
boxes in ICT and 27 billion connectivity modules in other sectors, and found that their 
life cycle emissions were only minimal. The report argues that data traffic is driven 
more by video than by IoT. However, the methodology underlying this analysis is not 
provided. 
 
Malmodin [2019] thinks that ICT can halve its emissions by 2030 relative to 2020 
through renewable energy transformation and through collective effort. He expects 
data centres to be 1% of global electricity use even in the future, even though the 
absolute amount is expected to go up. In a recent Ericsson blogpost building on 
Malmodin’s work, Lövehagen [2020] claims that ICT’s carbon footprint could be 
reduced up to 80% if all electricity came from renewable energy. Importantly, she 
makes clear that ICT could be both a tool for decreasing or increasing global carbon 
emissions by accelerating carbon-intensive processes, depending on how it is used. 
 
Another reason for stabilisation of emissions for Malmodin is his belief that there are 
limits to ICT’s carbon footprint as smartphone markets saturate and there are a limited 
number of hours per day that users can use ICT equipment [personal communication]. 
Malmodin [personal communication] notes that the impact of AI and machine learning 
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is so far very small even though it has been around for a while, and that emissions 
from AI are unlikely to explode unless training AI becomes more efficient.  
 
Limitations and criticism 
M&L and Malmodin’s follow-up research present the most recent research on global 
ICT emissions reviewed here and the one with the widest scope in terms of ICT 
equipment, lifecycle stages and supply chain emissions considered.32 Unlike Belkhir’s 
and Andrae’s studies, the estimates are based on more recent and a wider range of 
measured data directly from industry rather than older data reported in the academic 
literature. This is valuable as trends in ICT can change fast. 
 
However, this data is also the biggest weakness, as it is not made public and cannot 
be scrutinised by the reader. Apart from one LCA for smartphones [Ercan et al. 2016], 
LCAs for device embodied and use phase carbon are not based on peer-reviewed 
LCA studies but on data by market research companies like IDC, IHS and Gartner 
whose reports are not available for free, even through university subscriptions. They 
are therefore not easily accessible for the reader either. 
 
In personal communication, Malmodin noted that data centre emissions might be 
overestimated by up to 13 MtCO2e for 2020 if the use of green electricity is taken into 
account, even though the investigation is still ongoing. For 2015, he notes that M&L 
should have used 0.63 kgCO2e/kWh instead of 0.6 kgCO2e/kWh. This would change 
the use phase carbon footprint upward by 5%. 
 
Malmodin has been challenged about his opinion that ICT’s carbon footprint has 
reached a peak and that energy growth is slowing despite data traffic increases, as he 
believes energy use is largely unrelated to data traffic, and his assumption that energy 
efficiency gains will continue [Belkhir and Andrae in personal communication]. This 
debate is examined in more detail in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.4. 
 
B.3 Drivers of change in ICT Future Emissions 
A&E predict that over the next decade, user devices will become less important and 
networks and data centres will become more important for ICT total emissions. This is 
partly due to: a shift from desktops and laptops to phones; an increase in data traffic 
through trends like video streaming, cloud computing and emerging new data-heavy 
technologies; and a higher share of mobile data transmission because of the popularity 
 
32 Unlike A&E and B&E, M&L consider all stages of ICT equipment lifecycle, that is material acquisition, 
parts and component production and assembly, transport and end of life. In addition to ‘classic’ ICT, 
they include the entertainment and media (E&M) sector, which includes TVs and other consumer 
electronics, such as cameras and audio systems in a car and portable GPS, e.g. for use in cars (see 
Table B.2). The study also includes operator activities and overheads, such as offices and business 
travel used by data centre and network operators, and enterprise networks, which are wireless and 
wired networks within business buildings that are operated by the company. The network emissions 
include the embodied carbon of infrastructure, like digging cable ducts and constructing antenna towers 
spread over its lifetime. ICT used by the financial system is also in scope, including computers, TVs, 
networks and servers, but not cryptocurrencies with the rationale that mining cryptocurrencies required 
specific hardware, not regular servers. This rationale has been challenged by Belkhir [personal 
communication] as unreasonable as mining computers and servers use GPUs, which are found in 
gaming and are therefore within the scope of ICT. AI is included indirectly by covering all data centre 
emissions with a top-down approach. 
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of smartphones. In more recent papers [Andrae 2019a, 2019b, 2019c], Andrae also 
argues that trends such as AI and deep learning, IoT, Blockchain, virtual and 
augmented reality, facial recognition, and the rollout of 5G could lead to an explosion 
of data traffic over the next decade—increasing the share of data centres in ICT’s 
emissions. While the trend towards smaller devices like smartphones is helping 
reduce ICT’s emissions, we are also adding more devices like smart speakers and 
IoT. 
 
B&E point to the rising footprint of smartphones, with a share of 11% of total ICT 
emissions in 2020. As the number of users and the amount of data-heavy activities 
like video-streaming and social media on smartphones increases, this in turn 
contributes to an increase in mobile network and data centre use. Due to their short 
lifetime and increasing energy efficiency, the vast majority of smartphones’ emissions 
are embodied. They predict that data centres’ electricity use is going to rise but that 
emissions might stabilise if the trend of powering them with renewable energy 
continues. Network emissions are increasing slowly, and PCs’ emissions are 
decreasing. 
 
In contrast, M&L believe that AI and Machine Learning (ML) will not play a large role, 
unless training AI becomes more energy efficient because it would not be economical 
to run. Their assessment of IoT (even though with limited scope – see Section B.2.5) 
led them to conclude that the impact of IoT is, and will continue to be, minimal in the 
foreseeable future due to low data volumes; this is despite a possible explosion in the 
number of devices and network subscriptions. TV and PC emissions are decreasing 
due to better power management, lower standby power consumption and decreased 
sales. Their view is that other electronics are also declining – helped by a shift to 
smartphones which integrate functions such as video streaming, cameras, and 
portable media players, into one device. They highlight the large energy consumption 
of user access equipment that is on 24/7, such as modems, routers and set top boxes. 
They argue that the growth in data traffic is slowing down and that data centres and 
networks electricity consumption will not grow exponentially alongside the growth of 
data traffic because of efficiency gains and shifts to renewable energy.  
 
B.4 Reports out of scope of the review 
There have been several reports in recent years on the topic of ICT’s emissions, 
including on behalf of the Global eSustainability Initiative (GeSI), which represents ICT 
companies. In their report SMART 2020, produced by The Climate Group, they 
estimated ICT’s emissions at 530 MtCO2e in 2002 and 830 MtCO2e in 2007 and 
projected ICT’s footprint to rise to 1,430 MtCO2e in 2020 under business as usual. In 
a later report compiled by BCG, SMARTer 2020 [GeSI 2012], they estimated 
emissions in 2011 at 0.91 GtCO2e and revised their 2020 projection to 1.27 GtCO2e. 
Their latest report, SMARTer 2030 [GeSI 2015], compiled by Accenture, extends their 
earlier projections to 2030 with an estimate of 1.25 GtCO2e. The scope is summarised 
in Table B.1; for the 2015 report, it also includes 3D printers. In their reports, they also 
discuss ‘abatement potential’ by ICT in other industries whereby ICT could save 9.1 
Gt CO2e in 2020 and 12.08 Gt CO2e in 2030; we explore these trends in more detail 
in Section 2.2.5. Another report claiming emission reductions of 2.1 GtCO2e enabled 
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Policy Connect, a London-based thinktank, produced a report Is Staying Online 
Costing The Earth? [McMahon 2018] sponsored by Sony in 2018 that concluded that 
energy consumption by ICT is not necessarily going to rise due to efficiency gains, 
renewable energy, a trend to smaller devices and ICT-enabled carbon savings in other 
industries.  
 
The report Lean ICT – Towards Digital Sobriety, produced by The Shift Project 
[2019b], a Paris-based thinktank, came to a very different conclusion. They projected 
that ICT emits between 2.1 and 2.3 GtCO2e in 2020 and between 3.3 and 4.2 GtCO2e 
in 2025, including embodied and use phase carbon for PCs, phones, tablets, TVs, 
some IoT, networks and data centres. The modelling is based on Andrae and Edler’s 
(2015) study but with updated assumptions, such as data traffic and the number of 
devices used. These estimates lie between Andrae and Edler’s expected and worst 
case and therefore much higher than what the three main experts whose papers we 
reviewed above believe. The report points to several important trends, such as the 
impact of video streaming and short-lifespan devices, the underestimation of ICT’s 
emissions by consumers because the underling infrastructure is invisible, and the 
unequal distribution of data consumption with high-income countries benefitting and 
thus emitting more than low-income countries. 
 
These reports have not been included in the detailed review as they are not peer-
reviewed. In addition, there are potential conflicts of interest where reports are 
sponsored by ICT companies [e.g. McMahon 2018; GeSI 2015; GSMA 2019]. Policy 
Connect’s report largely relies on M&L’s study, which is included in our detailed review, 
rather than offering original insights. For The Shift Project’s [2019b] report, new 
modelling was done based on A&E’s study but the findings have been discredited by 
all of the experts consulted (including Andrae, Belkhir, Malmodin and Preist). In the 
case of GeSI, the modelling behind the report is not transparent and assumptions are 
not made clear so it cannot be fully assessed. 
C Video Streaming 
Video streaming has become the dominant driver of data traffic consumption - forming 
60% of downstream traffic and 22% of upstream traffic globally in 2018 [Sandvine 
2019]. This traffic demand has been driven by adoption of video-on-demand services 
offered by companies such as Netflix, Amazon Prime and Disney; the popularity of 
YouTube and the embedding of video clips into other online services (e.g. social media 
such as Facebook and Twitter); and the use of video for security surveillance and 
video conferencing. 
 
If travel is fully replaced by video conferencing, video offers significant carbon 
savings. 
Online video can most prominently provide opportunities for reduction in travel-related 
carbon emissions. For example, video conferencing for co-locating a conference can 
create significant emission reductions from flights [Coroama et al. 2013], creating 
dematerialisation if the potential of this media is “actively sought and unleashed” 
[Coroama et al. 2015]. Video streaming has shown how useful it is during the Covid-
19 outbreak, allowing entertainment during isolation as well as supporting home 
working. During the pandemic: replacing physical face-to-face meetings, for example, 
will reduce the travel-based emissions from business flights and peoples’ commutes 
to work; we have also seen academic conferences moving online. However, as 
highlighted in Section 2.2.5, the rise in video traffic and availability of video 
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conferencing has not yet led to a reduction in air travel [Graver et al. 2019], although 
this may change following the Covid-19 crisis. 
 
Video is accelerating data traffic. 
Video is clearly a prominent driver in data traffic which could significantly add to ICT’s 
growth and emissions (Section 2.2.4). For example, higher streaming qualities such 
as High Definition (HD) and Ultra HD (UHD) can have a “multiplier effect on traffic”: 
4K (UHD) doubles the bit rate of HD video and multiplies the bit rate of Standard 
Definition (SD) by nine [Cisco 2020]. Streaming qualities also affect device adoption, 
e.g. 66% of flat-panel TV sets are expected be UHD in 2023 (doubling the 33% share 
in 2018) [Cisco 2020], therefore impacting the embodied emissions of video-focused 
devices as users replace older TVs with newer models. In addition, faster 
infrastructure (e.g. 5G, fibre to the home) enables applications such as UHD cameras 
and VR streaming [Cisco 2020], multiple simultaneous streams within households 
[Widdicks et al. 2019], and now data-intensive gaming activities [Vaughan 2019] – 
driving the demand for video related network traffic and high performance streaming 
infrastructure such as content delivery networks and data centres further.  
 
Changes are required to stop continuous video and internet infrastructure 
growth. 
The Shift Project [2019a] estimated that 300 MtCO2e was generated in 2018 due to 
online video and argue that this is comparable to annual emissions of Spain in 2010. 
These estimates have come under scrutiny [Kamiya 2020] due to arguments that they 
were based on old data, that energy impacts of the internet are much lower [cf. 
Shehabi et al. 2014] and that energy intensities of data transmissions are halving every 
two years [cf. Aslan et al. 2017] – following the ‘Efficiency saves ICT’ narrative (Section 
2.2.2). These arguments also underpin some criticisms by TechUK [Fryer 2020] on a 
recent documentary BBC iPlayer [2020] “Dirty Streaming”, arguing the documentary 
provides misleading or incorrect information on ICT’s environmental impacts.   
 
The Shift Project may overestimate absolute emissions due to the direct processing 
of video traffic – especially as the energy per bit does improve over time, there is 
evidence that data traffic, including video, links more potently to growth in 
infrastructure and capacity. Preist et al. [2016] argue that growth in the internet’s 
infrastructure capacity allows for new data-intensive services and applications (of 
which video is a part) – offering new affordances to users, in turn driving demand for 
these services and therefore further infrastructure growth. Peak data traffic is one 
driver for this infrastructure growth due to increased demand for data-intensive 
services; other influences include overprovisioning the infrastructure to ensure these 
services are always available to all users even at peak times [Preist, personal 
communication]. Growth begets more growth, unless we put a ceiling on absolute 
demand. In addition, Belkhir [personal communication] highlighted that the agreement 
between Netflix (a major video streaming service) and EU regulators to ease Netflix’s 
load on the network during the Covid-19 pandemic [Sweney 2020] makes it difficult to 
argue data traffic is not interlinked with ICT infrastructure growth.  
 
This is where changes in online service design may have a positive impact, e.g. turning 
off the video for a large portion of YouTube users who are only listening to the content 
[Lord et al. 2015, Widdicks et al. 2019] can have comparable emission reductions to 
running data centres on renewable energy [Preist et al. 2019] — but much more will 
need to be done to mitigate the significant growth of video streaming. 
 
 




The assumptions about efficiency improvements and demand for ICT and predictions 
about ICT’s impact on emissions in the scientific literature and non-scientific reports 
and the media can be summarised in the form of six common ‘narratives’, as detailed 
below. Note that Rebounds in ICT, Rebounds stalled and Global Rebounds are 
theoretical possibilities for which there is some evidence in the scientific literature 
(Section 1.1); however, they are not commonly discussed in the literature on ICT’s 
emissions. 
The first four narratives relate to ICT’s own emissions, and the final two relate to ICT’s 
impact on the rest of the global economy. The arguments underlying each narrative 
are underlined; we explore these in Section 2.2. 
 
Efficiency saves ICT 
Efficiency improvements are continuing; in combination with a shift towards 
more renewable energy, this will offset increases in ICT’s energy use, 
stabilising ICT’s emissions at the current level or even decreasing it in the 
future. Emissions are not so much influenced by the increasing data traffic but 
rather by the number of users, which will naturally level off soon as the world 
reaches saturation for personal ICT devices. 
E.g. research by Malmodin and colleagues, Masanet and colleagues 
 
Growth without efficiency 
The growth in data traffic will lead to increases in network and data centre 
energy use, while the growth in IoT will lead to increases in embodied device 
emissions. 
A) In combination with efficiency improvements slowing down, this will lead to 
an exponential growth in ICT’s emissions. 
B) Even if efficiency improvements continue, they will lead to further emission 
growth because of Jevon’s paradox (Section 1.1), unless emissions are 
capped. 
E.g. research by Andrae and colleagues, Belkhir and colleagues 
 
Rebounds in ICT 
The efficiency improvements enabled by ICT in other sectors lead to system 
growth within ICT. Under current conditions, rebound effects are greater than 
100%. Therefore, the net effect of efficiency through ICT’s is a rise in global 
emissions. If efficiencies continue, ICT’s emissions will also increase unless 
they are deliberately constrained. 
 
Rebounds stalled 
If efficiency improvements stall (for example because Moore’s Law reaches its 




Because ICT enables carbon savings in other industries, the net effect of ICT 
is to lower global emissions despite growth in the ICT sector’s own footprint. 
E.g. GeSI’s SMARTer 2030, GSMA’s The Enablement Factor report 
 
 





ICT enables efficiencies in other sectors which lead to growth in the wider 
economy. Rebound effects are larger than the efficiency gains (i.e. greater than 
100%) and lead to an overall increase in global emissions. 
 
E Truncation Error 
There are two core methodologies for estimating the embodied carbon: the more 
commonly used Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) and Environmentally Extended Input Output 
(EEIO) analysis. LCA has potential for greater specificity as it is tailored to specific 
models, such as an iPhone 11, but inevitably incurs a truncation error; an 
underestimation arising from LCAs being unable to include the infinite number of 
supply chain pathways. To illustrate, a factory manufacturing computers will itself use 
computers to manage the production, a small share of whose embodied carbon needs 
to be attributed to the factory’s output. Most of the literature assessing the embodied 
carbon in ICT is LCA-based.  
 
EEIO offers a much more generic estimate, based on macro-economic modelling of 
financial and carbon flows between industrial sectors. It provides estimates of the total 
carbon emissions resulting from production of different types of goods per unit of 
monetary value. Whilst lacking specificity (i.e. all goods within broad categories, such 
as ‘manufacture of office machinery and computers’, have the same carbon footprint 
per dollar), EEIO-based estimates have the important advantage of taking account of 
emissions from all supply chain pathways; they do not incur truncation error.  
 
To get some of the best of both approaches, it is possible to combine LCA and EEIO 
methodologies by approximating and adjusting for the truncation error incurred by 
LCAs. This can be done by mapping the LCA’s system boundaries onto the EEIO 
model. Such a hybrid methodological approach stands to have both the specificity of 
LCA and the system-completeness of EEIO. In this report, we have drawn upon work 
carried out by SWC (see Appendix A.5.4) to derive adjustment factors for LCAs in 
different product categories and applied these to LCA-based embodied carbon 
assessments to derive system-complete estimates. 
 
Based on SWC’s EEIO model, we estimate that truncation error causes an omission 
of ca. 40% of the total embodied carbon and ca. 18% of the use phase carbon. When 
this is factored in, adjusting each study’s specific electricity intensity figures, estimates 
for 2020 are on average 25% higher. Table E.1 shows A&E, M&L and B&E LCA 
carbon estimates without adjustment of truncation error; Table E.2 shows the adjusted 
estimates when truncation error is taken into account. This is just an approximation. 
We reiterate the caveat that SWC’s EEIO model is based on UK data which is not 
representative of the world economy yet we have applied it to A&E’s, M&L’s and B&E’s 
global estimates for a rough estimate of underestimation. We also note that these 
studies likely incur truncation errors of different sizes due to their differences in 
methodology. We have only adjusted for these differences with respect to electricity 
carbon intensity, but not for embodied emissions. Due to its more inclusive scope, 
M&L’s is likely to have a smaller truncation error and A&E likely has a larger one than 
the average truncation error assumed here. 
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Table E.1 Original estimates of embodied and use phase carbon for 2020. Malmodin’s and A&E’s estimates 








Malmodin (2020) 300 787 1087 0.60 
B&E - 2020 
minimum 
213 894 1107 0.50 
B&E - 2020 
maximum 
349 957 1306 0.50 
B&E - 2020 
average 
(calculated) 
281 926 1207 0.50 
A&E - 2020 Best 
case 
157 730 887 0.59 
A&E - 2020 
Expected case 
326 1534 1860 0.59 
A&E - 2020 
Worst case 
1024 2610 3634 0.61 
  
Table E.2 Estimates for 2020 adjusted to include all supply chain pathways. 
*Included in the average. A&E’s best case was chosen because Andrae (2020) reported that this is the most 
realistic for 2020. An average calculated for B&E’s minimum and maximum estimates was included sinde B&E did 










500 826 1326 0.63 
B&E - 2020 
minimum 
355 1127 1482 0.63 
B&E - 2020 
maximum 
582 1206 1788 0.63 
B&E - 2020 
average 
(calculated)* 
469 1166 1635 0.63 
A&E - 2020 
Best case* 
262 781 1043 0.63 
A&E - 2020 
Expected case 
543 1628 2171 0.63 
A&E - 2020 
Worst case 
1706 2704 4410 0.63 
Average 410 925 1335 0.63 
 
For ICT, TV and other consumer electronics, the adjusted total ranges between 1.2 
and 2.2 GtCO2 in 2020 (2.1-3.9% of global GHG emissions, see Table E.3) with 30% 
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Table E.3 Estimates for 2020 adjusted to include all supply chain pathways and brought to the same scope. 






Malmodin (2020)* 500 826 1326 
B&E's Minimum + 
Malmodin's E&M 
figure 
457 1482 1940 
B&E's Maximum + 
Malmodin's E&M 
figure 





571 1522 2093 
A&E’s Best without 
TV + Malmodin's 
E&M figure* 
296 898 1194 
Average 456 1082 1538 
 
This scope does not include some ICT equipment, such as radios, Blockchain and 
most IoT. Using EEIO, Livia Cabernard from ETH Zurich [Cabernard 2019, Cabernard 
et al. 2019] estimates that ICT’s embodied carbon footprint (including manufacturing 
and transporting and covering a wider scope of ICT, specifically computers, mobile 
phones, TVs, radios, office machinery and all embedded ICT) was ca. 1.1 GtCO2e in 
2015. Of the 1.1 GtCO2e embodied emissions, 27% were from computers, 55% from 
radio, TV and mobile and 18% from ICT embedded in other end products. Over the 
last few decades, a production shift to China (61% of ICT production in 2015, 45% in 
1995) has increased the embodied carbon footprint of ICT because China’s electricity 
use is mainly from coal [Cabernard in personal communication]. 
 
Modelling future population growth, efficiency improvements in relevant sectors, such 
as steel production, and a transition from coal to renewable energy in line with actions 
taken to limit global warming to 2°C (6°C), Cabernard [personal communication, based 
on Wiebe et al. 2018] predicts that ICT’s embodied carbon footprint could be 1.38 (1.5) 
GtCO2e in 2020, 1.27 (1.56) GtCO2e in 2025 and 1.16 (1.64) GtCO2e in 2030 for 
embodied emissions of ICT manufacturing. That means that the estimates for 
embodied carbon in Table E.3 only cover a third of ICT’s true embodied carbon 
footprint, because some ICT equipment, such as radio, Blockchain and embedded 
ICT, is left out of scope. 
 
In summary, in most research on ICT’s emissions, ICT’s embodied carbon is 
considerably underestimated. While users are keeping their PCs and smartphones for 
slightly longer, the manufacturing footprint of smartphones is increasing because of 
more advanced integrated circuits, displays and cameras [Malmodin in personal 
communication]. With the number of IoT devices predicted to grow exponentially, the 









F European Commission’s Investment in ICT 
 
F.1 Artificial Intelligence 
The European Commission has ambitions to significantly increase uptake of AI as a 
way of “strengthen[ing] the competitiveness of European industry” [European 
Commission 2019d]. Specific initiatives and funding streams include Digital Innovation 
Hubs [European Commission 2018c] to “provide support to SMEs to understand and 
adopt AI” [NoCash 2020], and InvestEU (more on this below). The EC recently funded 
the 50 million Euro project “ELISE” which aims to “make Europe competitive by setting 
up a ‘Powerhouse of AI’” [FCAI 2020]. New Common European data spaces are also 
being set up to enable greater data sharing [Kayali et al. 2020], which may be used by 
AIs. The Commission also views AI as a “driving force to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals” [European Commission 2019d], so is funding “competitions and 
missions for AI solutions tackling specific environmental problems” [European 
Commission 2019e]. Examples of how AI is expected to produce emissions reductions 
in other sectors include “increasing the efficiency of farming, contributing to climate 
mitigation and adaptation, [and] improving the efficiency of production systems 
through predictive maintenance” [European Commission 2019d].  
 
F.2 Internet of Things 
The European Commission has launched the Alliance for Internet of Things Innovation 
to “to support the creation of an innovative industry driven European Internet of Things 
ecosystem” [European Commission 2019b]. Within the Digitising European Industry 
initiative, the Commission identifies three foci: 1) “a thriving IoT ecosystem”; 2) “a 
human-centred IoT approach”; and 3) “a single market for IoT”. The latter is facilitated 
through the “European data economy” initiative, which “proposes policy and legal 
solutions concerning the free flow of data across national borders in the EU, and 
liability issues” [European Commission 2019b]. The IoT is seen as playing a key role 
in the European response to climate crisis through providing an infrastructure to 
enable the ‘smart future’ (see, e.g. [ETIP SNET]), and for distributing energy 
consumption across smaller data centres [Gilmore 2018]. 
 
F.3 Blockchain 
The European Commission has established the European Blockchain Observatory 
and Forum to “accelerate Blockchain innovation and the development of the 
Blockchain ecosystem within EU and [to] help cement Europe's position as a global 
leader in this transformative new technology” [EU Blockchain 2020]. Along with AI, 
Blockchain is the target of the 2 billion Euro joint European Commission and European 
Investment Fund InvestEU Programme. In addition, the European Blockchain 
Partnership [European Commission 2018b] commits all member states to “realising 
the potential of Blockchain-based services for the benefit of citizens, society and 
economy” [European Commission 2020b]. As one of its potential benefits, Blockchain 
is viewed by the Commission as the kind of ‘disruptive technology’ required by the 
climate crisis [European Commission 2019c], and the Commission has outlined five 
core areas they seek to ‘unleash’ Blockchain technology in service of climate. Based 
on the idea that Blockchain can “improve the transparency, accountability and 
traceability” of GHGs, these application areas include areas of clean power, smart 
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transport systems, sustainable production and consumption, sustainable land use, 
and smart cities and homes. 
 
G Carbon Pledges 
Company pledges vary in particular with regards to scope of emissions covered (see 
Table G.1), offsets used and how much emissions are reduced. Note that there are 
also some companies with plans to cut emissions by a certain percentage but without 
the sweeping ambitions of the below pledges.  
 
Table G.1 Emissions covered by Scope 1, 2 and 3. 
Scope 1 emissions  Direct emissions from burning of fossil fuels on site 
(includes company facilities and vehicles). 
Scope 2 emissions  Indirect emissions from purchased electricity and gas.  
Scope 3 emissions   All other indirect emissions in a company’s value chain 
including upstream emissions in the supply chain (e.g. 
emissions from purchased goods and services, 
transportation of these goods to the company, use of 
leased assets such as offices or data centres, business 
travel and employee commuting) and downstream 
emissions (from transportation, distribution, use and end of 
life treatment of sold products, investments and leased 




G.1 Carbon Neutral 
Carbon neutral means no net release of carbon-dioxide emissions into the 
atmosphere, through using offsets to counterbalance any emissions generated.33 For 
a company to be carbon neutral, they must measure, reduce, and offset their 
emissions. 
 
There is no set standard on which (if any) scope 3 emissions should be included, how 
these emissions should be reduced (purchasing credits or on-site renewables, for 
example), and which offsets are robust and credible. 
 
Companies pledging carbon neutral: Sky (since 2006), Google (since 2007), Microsoft 
(since 2012), and Apple (by 2030).  
 
G.2 Net Zero 
Net zero is defined by the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) as a company 
having no net climate change impact through GHG emissions in a company’s value 
chain. This is achieved by reducing GHG emissions in the value chain and removing 
the remaining emissions through additional carbon removals. Companies setting a net 
zero pledge can register with the SBTi if their targets Net zero means no net climate 
change impact through GHG emissions in a company’s value chain, achieved by 
reducing GHG emissions in the value chain and removing the remaining emissions 
 
33 Note that most ICT companies refer to carbon dioxide and other GHG when they use the term ‘carbon 
neutral’. This is sometimes called ‘climate neutral’. 
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through additional carbon removals.  A net zero target is more ambitious than a 
carbon neutral target because it specifies that scope 3 emissions need to be 
included, while for carbon neutral, generally only emissions from business travel and 
waste are included but not other scope 3 emissions.  
 
Organisations can register their net zero targest with the Science Based Target 
initiative (SBTi) which certifies organisations whose emission targets are in line with 
the IPCC’s recommendations that global warming be limited to 2°C, well below 2°C or 
more recently to 1.5°C [IPCC 2018, Pineda and Faria 2019]. According to the SBTi, 
for company pledges validated after July 8th 2020, only two thirds of scope 3 emissions 
need to be accounted for and scope 3 emissions targets ‘generally need not be 
science-based’. A target needs to be set for reducing scope 3 emissions only if they 
make up over 40% of a company’s total emissions [SBTi 2019]. However, the Carbon 
Trust believes that net zero should apply to 100% of scope 3 emissions [Stephens 
2019].  
 
Net zero is also more ambitious than carbon neutral regarding offsets. SBTi specifies 
that ‘offsets must not be counted as emissions reduction toward the progress of 
companies’ science-based targets’ [SBTi 2020]. In the way Sky and Microsoft define 
net zero, any emissions that cannot be reduced need to be removed from the 
atmosphere rather than being avoided, whereas carbon neutral can use both emission 
removal offsets and avoided emission offsets [Sky Zero 2020, Smith 2020].   
 
Companies pledging net zero: Microsoft (by 2030), Sky (by 2030), Amazon (by 
2040), BT (by 2045) and Sony (by 2050). 
 
G.3 Carbon Negative 
Carbon negative (also sometimes described as ‘carbon positive’ or ‘climate positive’) 
is where an activity removes more emissions than it emits across an entire value 
chain. This goes further than both carbon neutral and net zero. There is currently no 
official definition or standards for this apart from the ones used by Microsoft for their 
carbon negative pledge [Smith 2020].   
 
Companies pledging carbon negative: Microsoft (by 2050).  
 
G.4 100% Renewable 
100% renewable means that all of a company’s power consumptions comes from 
renewable sources, such as solar, wind and hydro. It does not specify whether and 
how much the company’s emissions should be cut. Unfortunately, often companies do 
not provide detail on whether they will generate additional renewable energy on-
site, or buy renewable energy certificates, including unbundled REGOs which should 
not be seen as truly 100% renewable, in the authors’ opinion (see Appendix I). 
 
Companies pledging 100% renewable: Netflix (since 2018), Google (2017), Facebook 
(by 2020), Samsung (by 2020), Microsoft (by 2025), Sky (by 2020), Vodafone (by 
2025), Apple (since 2018).   
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G.5 Why scope matters  
Carbon neutral pledges are not enough for the world to limit global warming to 1.5°C 
because they do not require the company to account for scope 3 emissions, which 
form the majority of ICT’s carbon footprint. Voluntary emissions reductions of company 
Scope 1 and 2 emissions alone could theoretically be sufficient if every company in 
the economy played its part. However, without any kind of enforcement or reputational 
consequences, companies have a competitive advantage if they do not set of meet 
targets. In addition, companies could lower their scope 1 and 2 emissions by 
outsourcing carbon-heavy activities to suppliers, which would not decrease overall 
emissions. By signing up for scope 3 targets, companies take responsibility for their 
supply chain. They then have an incentive to encourage their suppliers to cut their 
emissions too, creating a snowballing effect in the economy.  
 
H Renewable Energy Purchases 
 
H.1 On-site Generation 
On-site generation of renewable energy is the best option for purchasing renewable 
energy. This is because, with on-site generation, the company carries the set-up 
costs of the renewable energy project and there are fewer transmission and 
distribution losses than when electricity is sourced from the grid.  It also ensures that 
additional renewable energy is created which is needed for a successful global 
transition away from fossil fuels.  
 
H.2 PPA with Bundled REGOs 
Companies can also buy a Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) for renewable energy. 
PPAs do not cover the set-up costs of a renewable energy project (unlike on-site 
generation) but they pay for the cost of the power generation and receive 
a bundled Renewable Energy Guarantees of Origin (REGOs) that certifies that each 
1 MWh of electricity purchased comes from a renewable energy project. REGOs 
ensure for each unit of renewable energy generated, only one company can claim the 
environmental benefits, avoiding double counting. PPAs ensure additionality because 
a company purchasing a PPA pays for additional renewable energy to be generated 
and fed into the electricity grid. They can also encourage the setup of new renewable 
energy projects because projects can attract funding from investors more easily with 
guaranteed buyers of PPAs lined up.  
 
H.3 Unbundled REGO 
Companies also have the option of buying an unbundled REGO without the actual 
energy to lower their scope 2 emissions. In this case, the environmental benefit of 
renewable energy gets separated from the energy itself. The company generating 
renewable energy can sell off the environmental benefit represented by the REGO but 
without selling the actual energy. The company buying the unbundled REGO can claim 
lower scope 2 emissions. Unfortunately, unbundled REGOs do not encourage greater 
power generation from renewable sources because the demand for REGOs is 
currently vastly outstripped by the supply thus making them very cheap. This means 
they are an ineffective instrument for investment into renewable projects 
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[Scott 2019] and cannot claim additionality. Because unbundled REGOs cannot 
claim additionality and the company buying it lays a sole claim to the “greenness”, 
thereby not sharing it with other electricity users, unbundled REGOs raise the carbon 
footprint of the electricity grid [Hewlett 2017]. The separation also makes it harder to 
track what renewable energy projects lie behind each certificate. A company wishing 
to reduce their Scope 2 emissions and become powered by 100% renewables should 
therefore look towards investing directly into renewable projects and PPAs in which 
bundled REGOs are purchased, crucially, with the underlying power.  
  
